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Kevin E. Dinius
Michael 1. Hanby II

DINIUS LAW
5680 E. Franklin Rd., Suite 130

Nampa, Idaho 83687
Telephone:
Facsimile:
ISB Nos.

(208) 475-0100
(208) 475-0101
5974, 7997

kdiniu.s@diniuslaw.com
mhanby@diniuslaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COLJRT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AATI FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

JANET BELL NIGHTENGALE,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-OC-0722814

)

-vs-

)

JASON QUINN, M.D.; IDAHO
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS; P.A.; KEVIN
MATIHEW TIMMEL, M.D.; AND
EMERGENCY MEDICINE OF IDAHO,
P.A.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF KEVIN E. DINIUS
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S

REPONSE TO DEFENDANT
KEVIN TIMMEL'S MOTIONS IN

LIMINE

)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO )
: S8.

County of Canyon

)

KEVIN E. DINIUS, being first duly swom, deposes and says as follows:
1.

I am one of the attorneys of record for the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action,

AFFIDAVIT OF KEVIN E. DINIUS IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT KEVIt)
TIMMEL'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE·)

0 0401

08/21/2008 18:38 FAX

20847

raJ°17/018

and make this Affidavit on the basi:; of my own personal knowledge and/or belief.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "An is a true and correct copy of relevant portions of

the transcript of the Audio-Visual Deposition of Dr. Dominic 1. Gross taken October 10,2008.
S',..DATED this ~ day of September, 2009.

Kev~. Dinius

SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN to before me thisLday of September, 2009.

~

No' y Public for Idaho
My Commission Expires: ~
7I / PC;..?
•

correct copy of the above and forc~',oing document was served upon the following by:
Steven K. Tolman

TOLMAN BRIZEE, PC
P.O. Box 1276
Twin Falls, ID 83303

D

D

US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery

[8J

Facsimile -: No. 733-5444

B

US Mail

o

Attorneys for Kevin Timmel, MD
Kevin 1. Scanlan

HALL FARLEY OBERRECHT &;
BLANTON
P.O. Box 1271
Boise, ID 83701

D
t8J

Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile ~ No. 395-8585

Altorneys for Jason Quinn, MD
...

for7IUSLAW
cml1':\ClieJlts\N\Nightengalc. Janet Bell 240S\l\Non-Di.coverylAffidavil in Support of R.c:sponse to TlmmeJ's Motions in Liminc,docx

AFFlDA VIT OF KEVIN E. DINIUS IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT KEVlij
TIMMEL'S MOTTONS IN LIMINE. 2

00402
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

T~E

FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JANET BELt NIGHTENGALE,

)
)

Plaintiff,
v.

) Case No. CV-OC-0722814
l
)
)

JASON QUINN, M.D., IDAHO
)
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, P.A.;
)
KEVIN MATTHEW TIMMEt, M. D.; AND)
EMERGENC~ MEDICINE OF IDAHO,
)
P.A.,
)
)

Defendants.

)

--~---------------------)

VIDEO'l'Al?ED DEPOSITION (:F DOMINIC L. GROSS, M.D.
October 10, 2008

Boise, Idaho

Amy E. Menlove,

CSR No. 685, gPR, eRR'

08/21/2008 18:37 FAX

1410181018

20847

October 10, 2008

Dominic Gross

Nightengale v. Quinn, et al.
(Page 16)

1

3

Niqhtanga~e's

case?

A.

I am not a'\rlare.

Q.

Okay.

I guess it's safe to say, but I've qot

4

to ask anyway, you were not involved at any level of any

5

peer review of Janet Nightengale's case; is that fair?

6

A.

Correct.

7

Q.

Were you ever paid for the surgery you

8

performed on Janet Nightenga~e on July 20th, 2007?

9

A.

Yes.

lO

Q.

When did you receive payment?

11

A.

I was awarB of payment two days ago from

12

indigent fund from my

13

office.

14

Until that point,

15

received payment with regards to her injury.

Dr. Margaret Jones, who is in my

And that was the first I ever heard of it.

16

Q.

17

the county?

Okay.

I

"\.,ras under the impression we have not

So any payaent you received came from

A.

Correct.

19

Q.

Okay.

20

A.

No, sir.

21

Q.

Is that what you and Dr. Foss were disagreeing

22

Do you know when that ooourred?

about in the correspondenoe, which is Exhibit 2 and 4?

23

A.

Correct.

24

Q.

When you say -- when I mean disagreement, the

25

disagreement involved payment for your services in

Associated Reporting Inc.
208.343.4004

UUU!iU!

ORIGINAL
Steven K. Tolman (IS8 #1769)
TOLMAN & 8RIZEE, P.C.
1323rd Avenue East
P.O. Box 1276
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1276
Telephone: (208) 733-5566
Attorney for Defendant Kevin Timmel, MD

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO,IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

JANET BELL NIGHTENGALE,
Case No. CV OC 0722814

Plaintiff,
vs.
JASON QUINN, M.D.; IDAHO
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, P.A.;
KEVIN MATTHEW TIMMEL, M.D.; AND
EMERGENCY MEDICINE OF IDAHO,
PA AND ITS AFFILIATES,

DEFENDANT KEVIN TIMMEL, M.Do'S
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE

Defendant.

COMES NOW, Defendant Kevin Timmel, M.D. (hereinafter referred to as "Dr.
Timmel") and files this Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion in Limine. This
Memorandum is made and based upon the record herein, and the following law and
argument.
INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Janet Bell Nightengale (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff") has filed
Plaintiffs Motion In Limine requesting the Court to limit the following items relating to Dr.
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Timmel: (1) requesting the court to limit the number of expert witnesses Dr. Timmel may
call in his case-in-chief and for rebuttal purposes; (2) the cause of plaintiffs arterial
occlusion; (3) evidence of subsequent drug and/or alcohol use by plaintiff; (4) relevance
of prior medical records of plaintiff, including prison records; (5) plaintiffs prior criminal
background; (6) whether non-emergency room experts may testify Dr. Timmel satisfied
the standard of care; (7) improper comments regarding the scope or effect of the
present case on the healthcare system and the medical practice of Dr. Timmel; (8) the
use of Dr. Draper as an expert by Dr. Quinn; (9) the limitation of Dr. Draper's testimony
to that elicited on direct examination; (10) the limitation of testimony that is speculative
and/or unsubstantiated; and (11) the scope of the expert testimony by Dr. Gregory
Henry.
Dr. Timmel objects to each basis for which plaintiff relies upon in support of her
motion in limine.

I.
ARGUMENT

1.

Dr. TimmeJ's Right to Answer Plaintiff's Allegations Under Idaho
Code § 6-1012 and 6-1013 Would Be Infringed By limitation of His
Proposed Expert Witnesses.

Plaintiff suggests that allowing Dr. Timmel to call multiple expert witnesses in his
defense "are duplicative and cumUlative" and "[s]uch would be a waste of time, cause
undue delay, and a needless presentation of cumulative evidence, under [Idaho Rule of
Evidence] 403." Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiff's Motion In Limine, p. 18. Plaintiff
also asserts "exclusion of one or both of [Dr. Timmel's] experts is clearly warranted" and
"[c]learly the nature of this request would not prejudice the Defendant in the same
manner that exclusion of a plaintiffs expert in a medical negligence case would
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because the defense is not required by statute to come forward with expert testimony in
the same manner s (sic) a plaintiff." Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiffs Motion In

Limine, p. 20, n. 3.
Plaintiffs assertion misstates the law. Dr. Timmel is required, by Idaho statute, to
establish his defense by expert testimony. If the Court excludes one or both of Dr.
Timmel's expert witnesses, he could not establish an adequate defense in the present
case. The testimony of Dr. Timmel's expert witnesses, Po Huang, M.D. F.A.C.E.P.
(hereinafter referred to as "Dr. Huang"), and John C. Moorhead, M.D., M.S., F.A.C.E.P.
(hereinafter referred to as "Dr. Moorhead"), is not duplicative or cumulative. Rather, the
testimony of both experts is vital and necessary to Dr. Timmel in providing and
establishing his defense.

a.

Idaho Code Sections 6-1012 and 6-1013 Govern Expert
Testimony.

The requirements of Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 regarding the proof
required in any malpractice case govern this matter. Idaho Code § 6-1012 specifies, in
relevant part:
In any case, claim or action for damages due to injury or death of any
person, brought against any physician ... such claimant or plaintiff must, as
an essential part of his or her case in chief, affirmatively prove by direct
expert testimony and by a preponderance of all the competent evidence,
that such defendant then and there negligently failed to meet the
applicable standard of health care practice of the community in which
such care allegedly was or should have been provided, as such standard
existed at the time and place of the alleged negligence of such
physician .. .in comparison with Similarly trained and qualified providers of
the same class in the same community, taking into account his or her
training, experience, and fields of medical specialization, if any.
I.C. § 6-1012 (emphasis added).
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This requirement under Idaho law -- the showing of a failure to meet the
applicable community standard of health care practice -- is a critical component which
must be proven in this case in order for plaintiff to prevail. Conversely, it is imperative
that Dr. Timmel be allowed to defend himself against plaintiffs allegations. In order to
do so, Dr. Timmel must be allowed to present evidence by qualified experts that Dr.
Timmel did not breach the community standard of health care practice. Dr. Timmel has
retained experts in order to testify to specific aspects of plaintiffs expert, Edward A.
Draper, M.D.'s (hereinafter "Dr. Draper"), expected testimony. Each expert is expected
to refute Dr. Draper's claim of breach of standard of care with regard to the specific area
of his expertise.
Idaho Code § 6-1013 governs how testimony from experts regarding this burden
of proof must be presented:
The applicable standard of practice and such a defendant's failure to
meet said standard must be established in such cases by such a plaintiff
by testimony of one (1) or more knowledgeable, competent expert
witnesses, and such expert testimony may only be admitted in evidence if
the foundation therefore is first laid, establishing (a) that such an opinion
is actually held by the expert witness, (b) that the said opinion can be
testified to with reasonable medical certainty, and (c) that such expert
witness possesses professional knowledge and expertise coupled with
actual knowledge of the applicable said community standard to which his
or her expert opinion testimony is addressed ...
I.C. § 6-1013 (emphasis added).
As it is expected that plaintiffs expert will testify Dr. Timmel failed to meet the
community standard of health care practice, Dr. Timmel must be allowed to match this
testimony with testimony of his own qualified expert witnesses.
In his deposition of August 25, 2009, Dr. Draper testified, among other things,
regarding the following: diagnosing a patient who presents with arterial occlusion and
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the diagnosis and treatment of an arterial occlusion.

See Deposition of Edward A.

Draper., M.D. (hereinafter Deposition of Dr. Draper) pp., 39-40 attached hereto as

ExhibitA.
The variety of subjects upon which Dr. Draper is expected to offer an expert
opinion necessitates experts to testify appropriately regarding the subject matter.
Plaintiffs Motion in Limine presupposes what testimony Dr. Timmel expects to illicit from
each expert. In essence, plaintiffs Motion asks this Court to prejudge said testimony
before it is offered. Plaintiff cannot assert that she knows exactly how Dr. Timmel will
question each witness and what that witness's testimony will be. The expected
testimony of Dr. Timmel's expert witnesses contradicts this assertion. Therefore, clearly,
there is a need for Defendant Timmel to present his expert witnesses and their
testimony. Dr. Timmel respectfully submits the determination of whether or not expert
testimony is cumulative is best left to the Court at the time the testimony is offered.
Moreover, Dr. Timmel has only retained two outside expert witnesses. This is a
minima! number in any medical malpractice case. Dr. Timme! strongly opposes
Plaintiffs Motion on the basis it would severely inhibit his ability to present an
appropriate and necessary defense at trial, as required by Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 61013, and violate his right to due process. Further, Dr. Timmel disagrees that the
testimony of the proposed expert witnesses is cumulative. Rather, Dr. Timmel
respectfully submits each proposed expert witness is necessary to rebut individual
aspects of Plaintiff's expert's anticipated testimony.
Each retained defense expert provides insight from his individual area of
emergency medicine into the community standard of health care practice for the
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diagnosis and treatment of patients who present to an emergency care physician with
the symptoms posed by plaintiff in July 2007. Therefore, Dr. Timmers witnesses are not
cumulative in nature, and should not be limited by this Court.
As such, Defendant respectfully submits this Court should deny Plaintiffs Motion.

b.

Dr. Timmel's Right to Due Process Would Be Hampered By
Extreme Limitation of Witnesses.

Dr. Timmel submits his due process right to a fair trial would be infringed by
granting plaintiffs motion in limine requesting the Court to preclude Dr. Timmel from
calling both expert witnesses. Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 governs when the testimony
of expert witnesses is admissible. State v. Eytchison, 136 Idaho 210, 212. 30 P. 3d 988.
990 (Ct. App. 2001). The Eytchison court stated:
If scientific. technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge. skill. experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." The
five sources of expert qualifications identified in the rule, knowledge,skill,
experience, training, or education, are disjunctive.
Id. at 212-213, citing Konechny, 134 Idaho at 414,3 P.3d at 539; State

v. Hopkins, 113

Idaho 679, 681, 747 P.2d 88, 90 (Ct.App.1987).
Once standing as an expert is established, the court must determine if the expert
has knowledge which will assist the trier of fact because of its specialized nature. State
v. Dragoman, 130 Idaho 537,542, 944 P.2d 134 (Ct. App. 1997).

The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution guarantees a trial of
fundamental fairness. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County, N.
C., 452 U.S. 18, 24; 379 U.S. 466, 471, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2158, L.Ed 2.d 640, 647
(1981). "For all its consequence, "due process" has never been, and perhaps never can
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be, precisely defined .... Rather, the phrase expresses the requirement of ''fundamental
fairness," a requirement whose meaning can be as opaque as its importance is lofty."
Id. at 24-25. As such, states are accorded leeway in crafting rules regulating the

admission of evidence.
The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Perry, acknowledged the idea that "(a)
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to present evidence is fundamental; however. this
right is subject to reasonable limitations." State v. Perry. 139 Idaho 520, 523, 81 P.3d
1230, 1233 (2003). citing U.S. v. Scheffer. 523 U.S. 303, 308. 118 S.Ct. 1261. 140 L.
Ed. 2d 413. 418 (1998). The conflict between the rights of the Fourteenth and Sixth
Amendments and the rights of states to limit evidence to prevent, among other things,
cumulative evidence and the waste of limited and valuable resources is at the heart of
plaintiffs motion in limine. Dr. Timmel submits his number and type of experts are not
unreasonable.
The court in Perry goes on to address the question of balance between due
pro~ess

rights and reasonableness when it notes U(t)he exclusion is "unconstitutionally

arbitrary or disproportionate only where it has infringed upon a weighty interest of the
accused." Id. at 1264. quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55. 107 S.Ct. 22704,
2711, 97 L. Ed.2d 37, 48 (1987). Although the court in Perry was addressing the
question in the context of a criminal case, a similar question is before this Court. Dr.
Timmel submits a central issue of this case -- the community standard of health care
practice for the time in question and whether there was a breach -- is a weighty interest
and unduly restricting Dr. Timmel's ability to present evidence on that core question by
limiting presentation of evidence to one expert, as requested by plaintiff, would render
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such a ruling "unconstitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate." As such, Dr. Timmel
respectfully requests this Court deny plaintiffs motion in limine requesting Dr. Timme/'s
preclusion of calling both of his disclosed expert witnesses.

c.

Dr. Timmel's Proposed Expert Witnesses Each Provide
Testimony Which Would Aid The Trier of Fact and Which Is Not
Cumulative.

Each of Dr. Timmel's proposed expert witnesses bring a unique perspective and
insight into the community standard of health care practice in existence during the time
and place relevant to these proceedings, July 2007, in Boise, Idaho. It is well
established within Idaho case law that the "admissibility of expert testimony is a matter
committed to the discretion of the trial court, and the court's ruling will not be overturned
absent an abuse of that discretion." Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 366, 128 P.3d 897,
903 (2005), citing Swallow v. Emergency Med. Of Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 67 P.3d
68 (2003). In order to "be admissible, the expert's testimony must assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Id. at 366.
In cases such as this where medical malpractice is alleged, the issue of
community standard of health care practice and whether it was breached is of central
importance. As noted above, Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 outline the proof
required to show that the community standard of health care practice was breached and
how the foundation for such testimony must be laid. This requirement is reiterated
throughout Idaho case law. In order to survive even summary judgment, there must be
a showing that there was a failure to meet the applicable community standard of health
care practice, as defined by Idaho Code § 6-1012. Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Regional
Medical Center, 137 Idaho 160, 164, 45 P.3d 816, 820 (2002). This definition of "the
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standard of care (is) for the class of health care provider to which the defendant
belonged and was functioning, taking into account the defendant's training, experience,
and fields of medical specialization, if any." Id. at 166, citing Kolin v. Saint Luke's Reg'l

Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 940 P.2d 1142 (1997); Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902,
935 P.2d 165 (1997). Idaho Code § 6-1013 goes on to establish how the foundation for
such expert testimony must be laid. Id., citing Morris ex rei. Morris v. Thomson,130
Idaho 138, 937 P.2d 1212 (1997); Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208,868 P.2d 1224

(1994); Dunlap ex reI. Dunlap v. Gamer, 127 Idaho 599, 903 P.2d 1296 (1994).
In the above-entitled matter, plaintiff's proposed expert witness, Dr. Draper, is
expected to testify that he is familiar with the community standard of health care
practice for emergency room physicians in Boise, Idaho, in July 2007. See Deposition of

Dr. Draper, p. 85, attached hereto as Exhibit A. Dr. Draper is also expected to testify
that Defendant Timmel breached this standard of care. Id., pp. 76-78 attached hereto as
Exhibit A. In order to effectively present a defense in this matter, Dr. Timmel must be
allowed to present expert witnesses to assist the trier of fact. To this end, Dr. Tim mel
has retained expert witnesses who will dispute plaintiffs expert's claim of the community
standard of health care practice for the time in question and his opinion that Dr. Timmel
breached that standard.
In her supporting Memorandum, plaintiff claims Dr. Timmel's antiCipated experts
offer "identical" opinions to one another. Dr. Timmel respectfully suggests that a closer
reading of Dr. Timmers Expert Witness Disclosure shows otherwise. Simply because
Dr. Timmers proposed experts reach the same conclusions regarding the community
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standard of health care practice and whether it was breached does not mean that their
analysis of the question is cumulative and therefore not helpful to assist the trier of fact.

i.

Dr. Huang, M.D., F.A.C.E.P. - General Standard of Care
for Emergency Medicine Physicians in Boise, Idaho and
Patients Presenting With Arterial Occlusion.

Dr. Huang will provide the trier of fact with insight as a board certified emergency
medicine physician who is currently an emergency room physician who practiced
medicine and treated patients in Boise, Idaho in July 2007. Dr. Huang is expected to
testify regarding the general standard of health care practice for 2007. He is expected to
testify regarding the applicable standard of health care for treating and diagnosing a
patient presenting with the symptoms which plaintiff had at the time she was seen by
Dr. Timme/.
Dr. Huang will testify that an emergency medicine physician's medical decision
making process requires a collection of information until sufficient information has been
obtained from which he can reach a threshold for decision making, such as a medical
impression or working diagnosis. Dr. Huang will testify that Dr. TimmeJ did not breach
the local community standard of health care practice in stopping his physical neurologic
examination of plaintiff once plaintiff told him to stop treatment. Dr. Huang is expected to
testify that Dr. Timmel did not breach the local community standard of health care
practice by not ordering further diagnostic tests for plaintiff once she informed Dr.
Timmel to stop the examination and to stop providing care to her.
Dr. Huang has familiarized himself with the local community standard of health
care practice relevant in this case, i.e. Boise, Idaho, in July, 2007, by virtue of his
practicing as an emergency medicine physician in Boise, Idaho in July 2007. Dr.
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Huang's expected testimony also differs from the testimony of Dr. Moorhead because
Dr. Huang will testify from the perspective of a local emergency medicine physician
practicing medicine in the same, local community as Dr. Timme/.

ii.

Dr. Moorhead, M.D., M.S., F.A.C.E.P. - Standard of Care
as A Emergency Medicine Physician Nationally v. Boise,
Idaho, Patients Presenting with Arterial Occlusion.

Dr. Moorhead is board certified in emergency medicine. He is a practicing
physician who is also a Professor of Emergency Medicine at Oregon Health and
Science University's School of Public Health and Preventive Medicine in Portland,
Oregon. Dr. Moorhead currently practices emergency medicine in Portland, Oregon.
Dr. Moorhead's testimony differs from the proposed testimony of Dr. Huang
because Dr. Moorhead is expected to testify from the perspective of an emergency
medicine physician working in a more urban community (Le. Portland, Oregon) and who
ostensibly sees more homeless patients. Dr. Moorhead is also expected to testify from
the perspective of a professor of emergency medicine concerning the atypical
presentation of plaintiff relating to her stopping Dr. Timmel's examination of her left arm.
Dr. Moorhead is expected to testify that, from his perspective as both a practicing
emergency medicine physician and as a professor of emergency medicine, Dr. Timmel
did not breach the local community standard of health care practice in stopping his
physical neurologic examination of plaintiff once plaintiff told him to stop treatment. Dr.
Moorhead is expected to testify that Dr. Timmel did not breach the local community
standard of health care practice by not ordering further diagnostic tests for plaintiff once
she informed Dr. Timmel to stop the examination and to stop providing care to her. Dr.
Moorhead will testify that the national standard of care and the local standard of care in
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Boise, Idaho in July 2007 does not materially differ and Dr. Timmel's handling of
plaintiffs treatment did not violate the local standard of health care practice.
Additionally, Dr. Moorhead is expected to testify regarding the patient's responsibility for
his or her own health, and how that applied to the instant case.
Dr. Moorhead has actual knowledge of the community standard of health care
practice for the Boise, Idaho, area during the relevant time and he has verified that
knowledge by speaking with a local emergency medicine physician. Dr. Moorhead is
expected to testify regarding the general standard of health care practice for 2007. He is
expected to testify regarding the applicable standard of health care for treating and
diagnosing a patient presenting the symptoms which plaintiff had at the time she was
seen by Dr. Timme/.

d.

Dr. Timmel Would Suffer Extreme Prejudice if One or Both of
His Expert Witnesses is Excluded.

Dr. Timmel acknowledges it is the discretion of the court to allow expert
testimony to assist the trier of fact. Expert witnesses provide testimony on issues which
would not be readily known to the general public. Dr. Timmel submits his proposed
expert witnesses offer valuable, unique insight into the underlying question of the local
community standard of health care practice and the alleged breach of said standard in
this case. Each of Dr. Timmel's proposed experts address the issue of the relevant
community standard of health care practice from the perspective of their specialties and
based upon their different experiences both in education and careers, in order to
present a cohesive, comprehensive view of the local community standard of health care
practice for treatment relevant for the trier of fact. These witnesses are critical to Dr.
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Timmel's ability to present a complete case in his defense. To limit his ability to do so
would greatly impact his right to due process.
Moreover, Dr. Timmel would suffer substantial prejudice if one or both of his
expert witnesses were precluded from testifying. The fact plaintiff is limited to one expert
witness testifying about Dr. Timmers alleged breach of the applicable standard of health
care practice, should not limit Dr. Timmel to one or no expert witnesses testifying in his
defense that he did not violate the standard of health care practice. Dr. Timmel should
be allowed to call as many expert witnesses as he needs to defend himself. Also, if
judgment is entered against Dr. Timmel, then Dr. Timmel must report to the National
Practioner's Databank. This is a serious potential consequence to Dr. Timmel of the
current litigation, and therefore, he should be able to defend himself the way he sees fit
and deserves including calling two expert witnesses to testify on his behalf.
Allowing Dr. Timmel to present a comprehensive defense does not unfairly
prejudice Plaintiffs ability to prepare for trial, as asserted. Plaintiff was provided with
Dr. Timmel's Expert Witness Disclosure in compliance with this Court's Scheduling
Order, which included detai/ed information regarding their expected testimony and their
qualifications for providing such testimony. Thus, Dr. Timmel should be allowed to call
both of his disclosed expert witnesses, Dr. Huang and Dr. Moorhead, in his case-inchief and potentially in rebuttal.
There is no evidence that allowing such testimony would result in excessive time
or expense to either plaintiff or to the Court in hearing the case. As such, Dr. Timmel
respectfully submits plaintiff's Motion should be denied.
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2.

Dr. Timmel Should Be Allowed to Opine that the Cause of Plaintiff's
Arterial Occlusion Was Plaintiff's Prior IVIIA Drug Use.

Plaintiff argues Dr. Timmel should be prohibited from presenting evidence
regarding plaintiffs prior IVIIA drug use and claims such evidence is not relevant, or in
the alternative, its probative value is outweighed by the prejudicial effect to the plaintiff.
Dr. Timmel objects to any limitation in testimony or opinion regarding the cause(s) of
plaintiffs arterial occlusion including evidence regarding plaintiffs prior IV/IA drug use.
Plaintiff has the burden of proving the elements of negligence against Dr.
Timmel, which include (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) actual and proximate causation, and (4)
damages. In attempting to prove Dr. Timmel's liability. plaintiff argues Dr. Timmel
breached the applicable standard of health care practice by allegedly failing to diagnose
an arterial occlusion causing alleged damages to plaintiff due to the subsequent
amputation of her left arm.
Dr. Timmel should be allowed to present evidence regarding plaintiffs prior IVIIA
drug use because such evidence is relevant to the issue of liability for the alleged
negligence. The causation of the arterial occlusion is relevant because on July 16,
2007, when plaintiff presented to Dr. Timmel at the St. Luke's Regional Medical Center
in Boise, Idaho, plaintiff only provided a medical history to Dr. Timmel describing trauma
to her left arm. See Deposition of Dr. Timmel, pp. 27-30, attached hereto as Exhibit B.
As described by the plaintiff, the trauma she suffered to her left arm would not lead to
an ischemitic injury such as an arterial occlusion, but rather, would suggest
muscoskeletal problems with the arm.
Therefore, Dr. Timmel must be allowed to present evidence regarding the
causation of plaintiffs arterial occlusion because the medical history provided by plaintiff
DEFENDANT KEVIN TIMMEL, M.D.'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN
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to Dr. Timme/ dictates the probability of various causative events. The evidence of
plaintiff's prior IVIIA drug use is relevant because plaintiff did not provide Dr. Timmel
with this information at the time of the July 16, 2007 examination. Evidence regarding
plaintiffs drug use is relevant to show Dr. Timmel did not breach the applicable
standard of health care practice in his treatment of the plaintiff, and therefore, is not
liable for medical negligence. Since plaintiff failed to provide a complete medical history,
Dr. Timmel did not violate the standard of health care practice in his treatment of plaintiff
because her description of her injury only considers muscoskeletal injury rather then
ischemitic injury.
Furthermore, Dr. Timmel has asserted the affirmative defense that plaintiff was
comparatively at fault for withholding from Dr. Timmel information about plaintiff's
medical history. Plaintiff has the burden of proving any alleged damages as an element
of her negligence claim against Dr. Timmel. Plaintiffs comparative negligence regarding
her failure to provide a complete and accurate medical history to Dr. Timmel is a valid
defense for both the issue of liability and the issue of damages. See Englert v.

Carondelet Health Network, 199 Ariz. 21, 13 P.3d 763 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000). Thus,
evidence regarding plaintiff's prior IVIIA drug use is also relevant to show the
comparative negligence of plaintiff in failing to provide all necessary information in her
medical history to Dr. Timmel in order for him to conduct a complete examination of
plaintiffs arm.
Evidence regarding plaintiff's prior IVIIA drug use is relevant because plaintiff's
medical history, as provided to Dr. Timmel. dictates the probable causes of her arterial
occlusion and her description to Dr. Timmel of the trauma to her arm indicates
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muscoskeletal injury rather than ischemitic injury. Plaintiffs failure to provide a complete
medical history, including her previous IVIIA drug use, proves elements of comparative
negligence which the jury must consider in determining any liability and/or damages
attributable to all parties and non-parties to the present litigation.
Thus, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 403, the probative value of the
evidence regarding plaintiffs prior IVIIA drug use outweighs any danger of unfair
prejudice because such evidence determines the liability for negligence, if any,
attributable to Dr. Timme/. Also, the probative value of such evidence outweighs the
prejudicial effect because such evidence is determinative regarding the comparative
negligence and fault of the plaintiff pertaining to her alleged damages. Dr. Timmel has
disclosed comparative negligence as a defense to the plaintiff based upon plaintiffs
failure to provide a complete medical history, including her failure to provide information
regarding her past IVIIA drug use, to Dr. Timme/. Plaintiff will not suffer prejudice by the
presentation of evidence regarding her prior IVIIA drug use. Therefore, the Court should
allow the presentation of evidence pertaining to plaintiffs prior IVIIA drug use.

3.

Dr. Timmel Should Be Permitted to Elicit and Offer Evidence
Regarding Plaintiff's Drug AndlOr Alcohol Use After July 20,2007.

Plaintiff requests the Court to prohibit any eliciting or offering .of evidence
pertaining to plaintiff's drug and/or alcohol use after July 20,2007. Dr. Timmel objects to
any limitation in testimony or opinion regarding plaintiffs drug and/or alcohol use after
July 20,2007.
Plaintiff has the burden of proving damages allegedly and proximately caused by
Dr. Timme/. Plaintiff submits her actions after July 20, 2007 are not relevant under Idaho
Rule of Evidence 401. However, Dr. Timmel argues plaintiffs conduct, including

4 '" .
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evidence regarding her drug and/or alcohol use after July 20, 2007 is extremely relevant
in relation to the element of damages. Moreover, such evidence is also highly probative
and outweighs any prejudicial effect plaintiff may suffer pursuant to Idaho Rule of
Evidence 403.
Evidence of plaintiff's drug and/or alcohol use after July 20, 2007 pertains to the
issue of plaintiff's life expectancy, and therefore, is relevant and probative to any
damages alleged by plaintiff against Dr. Timme/. Plaintiff's lifestyle choices, including
any drug and/or alcohol use after July 20, 2007, are relevant to show a shorter life
expectancy for the plaintiff. Plaintiff's continued use of cigarettes, alcohol, and
recreational drugs after July 20, 2007, are factors that lay a foundation of a shorter life
expectancy for the plaintiff. A shorter life expectancy for the plaintiff, in turn, is directly
relevant and applicable to any calculation of damages, if any, by the jury.
Therefore, such information and evidence is highly and extremely relevant.
Plaintiff will not suffer prejudice by the Court's admission of such testimony because
plaintiff has the burden of proving the element of damages. Life expectancy, and the
factors affecting life expectancy (Le. plaintiff's post-July 20, 2007 drug and alcohol use),
is a critical and essential component of the calculation of such damages. Thus, Dr.
Timmel should be permitted to introduce and present evidence regarding plaintiff's drug
and/or alcohol use after July 20,2007.

4.

Dr. Timmel Should Be Allowed to Present Evidence Pertaining To
Plaintiff's Prior Medical Records, Including Prison Records.

Plaintiff requests the Court to prohibit any eliciting or offering of evidence
regarding plaintiff's medical records prior to 2007, including prison records. Dr. Timmel
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objects to any limitation in presenting evidence pertaining to plaintiffs prior medical
records, including prison records.
Plaintiff has the burden of proving damages allegedly and proximately caused by
Dr. Timmel. Plaintiff argues her medical records, including prison records, prior to 2007
are not relevant under Idaho Rule of Evidence 401. However, Dr. Timmel submits
plaintiff's pre-2007 medical records, including prison records, is extremely relevant in
relation to the element of damages. Moreover, such evidence is also highly probative
and outweighs any prejudicial effect plaintiff may suffer pursuant to Idaho Rule of
Evidence 403.
Evidence of plaintiffs medical records prior to 2007, including her prison records,
pertains to the issue of plaintiff's life expectancy, and therefore, is relevant and
probative to any damages alleged by plaintiff against Dr. Timmel. Plaintiff's pre-2007
medical records, including prison records, are relevant to show a shorter life expectancy
for the plaintiff. Plaintiff's medical records, including prison records, provide information
which lay a foundation of a shorter life expectancy for the plaintiff. Plaintiff's medical
records show the health problems which plaintiff suffers from, including Hepatitis Band
Hepatitis C. See Deposition of Janet Bell Nightengale, p. 82, attached hereto as Exhibit
C. For example, the fact plaintiff suffers from both Hepatitis Band C are relevant in
showing a shorter life expectancy for the plaintiff, and therefore, is directly relevant and
applicable to any calculation of damages, if any, by the jury.
Thus, such information and evidence is highly and extremely relevant. Plaintiff
will not suffer prejudice by the Court's admission of such testimony because plaintiff has
the burden of proving the element of damages. Life expectancy, and the factors
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affecting life expectancy (Le. plaintiff's pre-2007 medical records, including prison
records), is a critical and essential component of the calculation of such damages.
Thus, Dr. Timmel should be permitted to introduce and present evidence regarding
plaintiff's medical records prior to 2007.
5.

Dr. Timmel Should Be Permitted to Present Evidence Regarding
Plaintiff's Prior Criminal Background.

Plaintiff requests the Court to prohibit any presentation of evidence regarding
plaintiff's prior criminal background. Dr. Timmel objects to any limitation in presenting
evidence pertaining to plaintiff's prior criminal background.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 609 states:
Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime.
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence of the fact that the witness has been convicted of a felony and
the nature of the felony sha/l be admitted if elicited from the witness or
established by public record, but only if the court determines in a hearing
outside the presence of the jury that the fact of the prior conviction or the
nature of the prior conviction, or both, are relevant to the credibility of the
witness and that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs
its prejudicial effect to the party offering the witness. If the evidence of the
fact of a prior felony conviction, but not the nature of the conviction, is
admitted for the purpose of impeachment of a party to the action or
proceeding, the party shall have the option to present evidence of the
nature of the conviction, but evidence of the circumstances of the
conviction shall not be admissible.
I.R.E. 609(a).
Plaintiff has been convicted of at least one felony, which plaintiff described as an
"Assault 3." See Deposition of Janet Bell Nightengale, pp. 14,46-47, attached hereto as
Exhibit C. She also testified in her deposition that she has had other felony convictions.
See Deposition of Janet Bell Nightengale, pp. 14,46-47, attached hereto as Exhibit C.
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Dr. Timmel submits evidence of plaintiff's prior felony convictions are relevant for
impeachment, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 609, of plaintiff's credibility.
Moreover, a material fact at issue in the present case is the incomplete and
deficient medical history which plaintiff failed to provide to Dr. Timmel at the time of his
examination of her arm on July 16, 2007. Dr. Timmel should be permitted to impeach
plaintiff's credibility regarding truthfulness, pursuant to Idaho Rules of Evidence 608 and
609. Dr. Timmel asserts plaintiff's prior felony convictions are extremely relevant and
highly probative to plaintiff's credibility as a fact witness pursuant to Idaho Rule of
Evidence 403. Furthermore, plaintiff's prejudice would not outweigh the probative value
of the introduction of such evidence because the jury should be able to weigh the truth
and veracity of plaintiff's testimony and her credibility after Dr. TimmeJ's impeachment of
her by evidence of her prior felony convictions.
Impeachment of the plaintiff by introduction of her prior felony convictions does
not add confusion to the issues at trial nor result in a waste of time. Thus, Dr. Timmel
should be permitted to present evidence regarding plaintiff's prior criminal background.

6.

Dr. Kevin G. Shea, M.D. Should Be Permitted to Testify Regarding His
Experience with Emergency Room Physicians.

Plaintiff requests the Court to prohibit Dr. TimmeJ's expert witness, Kevin G.
Shea, M.D. from testifying as to the standard of care for emergency room physicians.
Although Kevin G. Shea, M.D. (hereinafter referred to as "Dr. Shea") is not an
emergency room physician, Dr. Shea should be permitted to testify regarding his
experiences as an orthopedic surgeon working with, and alongside, emergency room
physicians.
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In addition, Dr. Shea is expected to address, explain and render opinions
concerning medical subjects within his expertise which are related to the present case,
including, but not limited to:
arterial duplex, arterial ultrasound, thrombus, emolus, arterial injection
injury, timing of arterial injury, arterial dissection, arterial spasm, arterial
blockage, acute blockage, chronic blockage, IV drug use, subclavian
artery, arterial blood flow, ischemia, venous blood flow, bipolar disorder,
PTSD, Hepatitis B, Hepatitis C. necrotizing arteritis, neurologic
examination, sensory testing, subacute process, morphine sulfate, x-ray
or imaging studies, osseous structures, pallor, platelet aggregation.
pulses, radial pulse. ulnar pulse, arthritis, capillary refill, vascular
profusion, and vascular emergency.
See Defendant Kevin Timmel, M.D.'s Disclosure of Expert Witnesses, p.31 (emphasis

added).
Therefore, Dr. Shea has expert knowledge and opinions regarding many of the
issues presented in the above-entitled case, including the taking of pulses. Dr. Shea is
qualified to testify whether it was "reasonable for Dr. Timmel, given Mrs. Bell
Nightengale's refusal to allow further examination, to rely upon the nurse's recording of
pulses being present" and Dr. Shea should not be precluded from testifying regarding
such actions and items, either in Dr. Timmel's case-in-chief or rebuttal.

7.

Dr. Timmel Should Be Permitted to Reference the Present Case As
An Alleged "Medical Malpractice" Case.

Plaintiff requests the Court to prohibit characterizing the present case as one of
"medical malpractice." Plaintiff moves the Court to enter an order stating the parties
must refer to the case as one of "medical negligence" rather than one of "medical
malpractice" claiming such term ("medical malpractice") may bias or prejudice members
of the jury against the plaintiff's case.
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Dr. Timmel objects to any such order or limitation in characterizing the present
case. Idaho Code, Title 6, Chapter 10 is titled "Medical Malpractice." Plaintiff has
initiated an action pursuant to Idaho Code, Title 6, Chapter 10 alleging Dr. Timmel
violated the "Medical Malpractice" Act. Moreover, Idaho Code § 6-1012, which plaintiff
must prove, is titled "Proof of community standard of health care practice in
malpractice case." I.C. § 6-1012 (emphasis added).
Plaintiff cannot dispute the present case is an action alleging "medical
malpractice" pursuant to Idaho Code. Therefore, the Court should deny plaintiffs
request to limit characterization of the above-entitled case as one only for "medical
negligence" thereby prohibiting the use of the term "medical malpractice." Plaintiffs
request is inappropriate and the Court should deny plaintiffs motion and permit the
parties to refer to the case as either a "medical malpractice" or "medical negligence"
action.
Furthermore, Dr. Timmel objects to any request by plaintiff limiting his ability to
discuss the consequences that he would suffer if a judgment is entered against him at
the conclusion of the tria/. As stated previously, if a judgment is entered against Dr.
Timmel, he must report to the National Practitioner's Databank. Dr. Timme' should be
permitted to produce evidence and argue the consequences he would incur personally
and professionally if a judgment is entered against him. Thus, Dr. Timmel requests the
Court deny plaintiff's motion in limine which moves for any such restriction.
8.

Dr. Timmel's Objections Regarding The Limitation of Dr. Draper's
Testimony to that Elicited on Direct Examination; the Use of Dr.
Draper As An Expert By Dr. Quinn; the Limitation of Testimony that
is Speculative and/or Unsubstantiated; and the Scope of the Expert
Testimony by Dr. Gregory Henry.
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Plaintiff requests the Court to limit Dr. Timmel's cross-examination of Dr. Draper
to the testimony elicited on direct examination. Dr. Timmel intends to abide by the Idaho
Rules of Evidence regarding cross-examination of witnesses. However, to the extent codefendant, Dr. Quinn, objects to this specific motion in limine by plaintiff, Dr. Timmel
joins in said objection.
Plaintiff requests the Court to limit the use of Dr. Draper as an expert by Dr.
Quinn. Dr. Timmel joins Dr. Quinn's objection to this specific motion in limine by plaintiff
in its entirety.
Plaintiff requests the Court to limit testimony of Dr. Marx regarding the results of
an ultrasound study as speculative and/or unsubstantiated. Dr. Quinn intends to call and
utilize Dr. Marx as an expert witness. Dr. Timmel joins Dr. Quinn's objection to this
specific motion in limine by plaintiff in its entirety.
Plaintiff requests the Court to limit the scope of the expert testimony of Dr.
Gregory Henry. Dr. Quinn intends to call and utilize Dr. Henry as an expert witness. Dr.
Timmel joins Dr. Quinn's objection to this specific motion in limine by plaintiff in its
entirety.

II.
CONCLUSION

Based upon the preceding arguments, Dr. Timmel requests the Court to deny
plaintiffs Motion in Limine in its entirety.
DATED this

2d.~
day of September, 2009.
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2.

Attached as Exhibit A to Defendant Kevin Timmel, MD's Memorandum in

Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion in Limine are true and correct copies of pages from the
deposition of Edward A. Draper, MD, taken on August 25,2009, in this matter.

3.

Attached as Exhibit B to Defendant Kevin Timmel, MD's Memorandum in

Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion in Limine are true and correct copies of pages from the
deposition of Kevin M. Timmel, MD, taken on March 11,2009, in this matter.

4.

Attached as Exhibit C to Defendant Kevin Timmel, MD's Memorandum in

Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion in Limine are true and correct copies of pages from the
deposition of Janet Bell Nightengale taken on February 12, 2009, in this matter.
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Nightengale v. Quinn

evidence that contributed to that occluded artery was
some damage to the artery preexisting, and some prolonged
pressure on the artery, either from sleeping or lying
down on the artery or being injured and unconscious lying
on the arm. Those seem to be the most likely out of all
the possibilities in light of the record.
Do r know that's what happened? No.
Q. Well, and there is no way for US to know for
certain what happened in this case, right?
A. Right.
Q. But in terms of, you know, based upon your
knowledge and experience, you have concluded that the two
most likely causes are the impact to the artery from past
drug abuse and/or the prolonged pressure on the arm?
A. They make the most reasonable sense to me.
Q. And am I correct in understanding that those
two in conjunction could be the cause? Or either one of
those independently could have resulted in this problem?
A. Either one could have independently, but both
show up in the record, so I would imagine that it would
be more likely in conj unction with each other.
And I need to qualify it, all of this, by
saying that even when all was said and done and pathology
tissue reports were done on the amputated arm, there is a
great deal of inconsistency in the fmal diagnosis of
Page 37

1 really an exact science, correct?
2
A. I don't know whether I alluded to that or said
3 it, but I don't disagree with that statement. It's not
4 an exact science.
5
Q. And as an emergency room physician, you are
6 charged with having to use the various knowledge and
7 skill sets that you have been given through your training
8 and experience to evaluate and make judgments and do the
9 best that you can to treat what you're presented with in
1 a terms of the patient's complaints and the infonnation
11 you're given?
12
A. That's a fair characterization.
13
Q. You talk a little bit about the diagnosis of a
14 problem like this. And you indicate that the diagnosis
15 of a complete arterial occlusion is typically rather
16 straightforward.
17
Do you agree with that?
18
A. No, I wouldn't. The diagnosis of an arterial
19 occlusion, if it presents with the classic signs and
2 0 symptoms, is pretty straightfolWdfd. The classic signs
21 and symptoms are numerous and varied, and they're not all
22 present with every arterial occlusion, nor are they all
23 diagnostic of it.
24
So although it can be easier under one set of
25 circumstances than another, perhaps, to make that
Page 39

where the obstruction was in the artery, what kind of
obstruction it was, was it a tear in the artery, was it a
clot. And I don't believe it was even ever decided with
absolute certainty where the -- how far up the occlusion
extended. So there are a lot of unknowns in this case.
I would say we don't really know what was going
on in that artery even after the arm was taken off and it
was examined by a pathologist to come out of the
diagnosis or when it was examined with the ultrasound
before surgery. So it's tough to put an absolute reason
for the blocked arterial circulation since the caricature
of that blockage was never identified completely, the
location was never specified exactly. All we know is
what the result was in terms of the tissue in her arm.
Q. And isn't that the case that you as an
emergency physician run into quite frequently, that you
may not know either what the source is or what the cause
of something is?
A. Right. And fortunately, that's not
specifically the thing that we're looking for. The only
reason we look for that is to figure out what's going on
right now, make a diagnosis, and provide the appropriate
treatment.
Q. And I think you were alluding to it a little
bit earlier. The practice of medicine in general is not
Page 38
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diagnosis, it is rarely straightforward. There are some
cases of classical acute arterial obstruction that are
pretty easy, and I've had them in my experience. There
are others that are very, very difficult, and I've had
those in my experience.
So it really requires a look at all of the
factors going into the diagnosis to decide what the
diagnosis is.
Q. And would you agree that at least typically, a
partial arterial occlusion can be even more difficult to
identify because oftentimes it doesn't present with many
or all of the classic signs?
A. Exactly. A partial occlusion is much less
likely to ever be diagnosed while it was partial than a
complete occlusion is likely to be diagnosed when it is
complete.
Q. In this particular case, you've indicated that
the time of complete blockage can't be precisely fixed;
is that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. But it's your opinion that total arterial
occlusion did not occur any earlier than 48 to 72 hours
before she was emergently evaluated on July 20th, 2007?
A. Yes. And that's a judgment. It's not
something that can be proved, but that's my belief, that
Page 40
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months ago, I'm not sure.
But the 18th of June, she might have been
suffering from some ischemic symptoms because at that
time I think it was clear she was having some arm pain.
She mentioned that. Was that Dr. Yeakley?
Q. No.
A. Too many doctors. Who was the doctor on the
18th? Anyway, my opinion was her arm pain, when it was
mentioned on several occasions, probably was coming from
partial variable ischemia, blood supply problems to her
arm. Again, that's an opinion that I can't give you more
than maybe 50 percent confidence in.
But, yes, I believe that it was representing
some probable partial blockage of blood flow to the arm.
It's the only way I can make sense of the total picture.
Q. Right. And the other side of that is that the
ann was still being profused to some effect?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Would you agree with me from reading
Mrs. Nightengale's records that she is a poor historian?
A. No question about that.
Q. And that her history was not only atypical, it
was incomplete and many times inconsistent?
A. Absolutely, yes.
Q. Which makes it difficult for any emergency
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Q. Have you ever had a conversation with
Dr. Timmel?
A. You know, I don't know. I know I wouldn't
recognize him if I saw him. I'm sure I've talked to him
on the phone on a couple of occasions. Probably in tenus
of patients he was seeing in the emergency department at .
St. Luke's and sending over to the VA or patients that I
had at the VA and I wanted to talk to an emergency
department doctor there. But I honestly couldn't tell
you I've talked to him personally face-to-face.
Q. Have you talked or consulted with anyone other
than Mr. Dinius with respect to Dr. Timmel's care, which
is at issue in this case?
A. Only Dr. Schlender.
Q. Who?
A. I mean only Mr. Schlender.
Q. Other than legal counsel, though, you haven't
consulted with any other medical healthcare providers?
A. No.
Q. And when you drafted Exhibit 1, which was your
first draft, did you have all the medical records?
A. I had all of the medical records -- all the
emergency medical records from the 1st of June, from the
20th of July, the two records from the Ada County
Paramedics on two of those occasions. And I'm not sure,
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medicine physician to diagnose a problem?
A. Very difficult.
Q. You practiced with IEP I think you said 24
years?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know Dr. Po Huang?
A. Yes, I hired him.
Q. When you hired him, did you believe he was a
competent, capable emergency medicine doctor?
A. He's a smart guy. He's capable.
Q. Any reason to believe that he is not capable or
medically trained sufficiently to review the same records
that you've reviewed and formulate opinions in this case?
A. He's certainly trained to review records and
form opinions, no question about it.
Q. Do you have any criticisms of his ability to
ptactice medicine as an emergency medicine physician?
A. Not at all.
Q. Do you know Dr. John Moorhead from Portland?
A. I know him well. I've known him for 20 years
through ACEP. I have never practiced with him, so I
can't tell you what kind of a doctor he is. I know he's
a great guy. And from an organizational, political
association standpoint, he's a good guy. And he's got a
huge CV.
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but I believe I also had at least something regarding her
subsequent surgical care. I do know that I had a copy of
the ultrasound report, copy of the consultation with
Dr. Gilbertson. I think I must have had the operative
report and the history and physical from Dr. Gross.
I think anything I've had since then was an
addition. But I had all of those things for No.1. I
did not have Dr. Gross's two letters afterwards.
Q. And we'll come back to those.
A. Okay.
Q. But given the status of knowledge that you had
prior to and on September 18th of '07 when you drafted
this, did you believe that you had sufficient information
and knowledge from which to render the opinions that
you've stated in that letter report?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Was there anything that you were looking
for in the future to supplement or change the opinions
that you expressed in that letter?
A. The only thing that I was looking for that I
didn't have and never got were those extra bits of
information from the pathologist who made the report on
the tissue. And that was not necessarily to change my
opinion, but to give me a little more insight as to
what - actually what turned out to be the problem in
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1 that artery so it would be possible in looking back to
2 figure out whether the suspicion about an intimal tear,
3 which would suggest previous trauma, abrupt trauma, as

1
2
3

4 opposed to simply pressure on the ann or scarring in the

4

5 artery that might suggest repeated intravenous drug use
6 and the mist that went into the artery.

5
6

7
1bat's the only thing I was looking for, to
8 maybe flesh out my understanding of the case. I was not
9 looking for anything else for any purpose. But I think I
10 put the statement in there if there was other infonnation
11 that was pertinent, then I might have to go back and
12 rethink my opinions.
13
Q. And I think you talked about more further input
14 and examination.
15
A. Sure.
16
Q. SO what I'd like to do is explore with you for
1 7 a second what infonnation you actually gathered after
1 8 September 18th. You mentioned the two Dr. Gross letters.
19
A. Right.
20
Q. The court has excluded those.
21
A. Right.
22
Q. But do those letters fonn the basis of any of
23 your opinions or can you express those opinions without
24 those -25
A. Oh, I can expresses them without The only
Page 77
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thing they did was allow me to form an opinion about Dr.
Gross.
Q. Right.
A. But not about the care that I reviewed.
Q. SO you can render the opinions you're going to
render in this case absent those two letters and the
input and information from those two letters from Dr.
Gross?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, you have the Gross letters. The there are
four depositions that were taken - well, depositions
taken after your September 18th?
A. Right.
Q. Did information contained in those depositions
alter or supplement your opinions in any way?
A. They give me some more information after the
fact of what was claimed might have happened during these
four or five emergency department visits. They did not
change my basic opinion about the diagnosis and care upon
any of those emergency visits.
Q. SO the opinions you would have been expressed
on September 18th did not fundamentally change based upon
any of those depositions?
A. They did not. They did not. They were
interesting to read, but they did not change my opinions.
Page 78
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Q. Any other information that you have been
provided that you're relying upon in fonnulating your
opinions that would have supplemented or altered your
opinions expressed in Exhibit 1, the September 18th
letter and report?
A. Well, let me just ask you something so I'm sure
I know what you're - when you say supplemented or
altered, I would say yeah, it all supplemented. Did it
alter? No.
So nothing that I reviewed after those things I
reviewed before the September 18th report has caused me
to alter my opinion. But, I mean, supplemented, sure.
Q. Okay. And it may be a matter of semantics
between you and me.
There is a difference in my mind between
supplementing and supporting your opinions. You may have
gathered infonnation that you believe supports the
opinions you've previously rendered. But supplement, I
mean, added additional opinions A. Additional facts that would relate to my
opinion?
Q. Yes.
A. Gosh, not that I can think of. The -- I should
say that the deposition of Dr. Timmel added statements
about what he did and said and what he reported Janet
Page 79

1 Nightengale did and said, which are not covered in any of
2 the other material, either confmned or refuted.
3
So there were things in that deposition that
4 referred back to that emergency visit that are in
5 addition to what you can find when you read the emergency
6 record.
7
And so that was infonnation that was added
8 to -- has been added to my judgment since. I can't say
9 that it has changed my overall opinions of the case.
10
Q. SO there was nothing in any of the information
11 which has been supplied to you after September 18th that
12 has changed any of your opinions?
13
A. Not to my knowledge. There may be something
14 hidden there that I don't know which I'd be happy to
15 consider, but not to my knowledge.
16
Q. If you look at Exhibit 4 -- and I'm looking at
17 page 9.
18
A. Page 9 has indicated at the top "9 of IS"?
19
Q. Yeah.
20
A. Yeah, okay.
21
Q. And on that page, it has a subcategory of
22 "Rebuttal Issues."
A. Yes.
23
24
Q. Are those issues that you have addressed or
25 attempted to address in response to defendants', both
Page 80
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1
Q. Have you ever practiced at S1. Luke's?
2
A. Yes. I was chairman of the St. Luke's
3 emergency department for two years. I practiced there
4 from 1981 through 1996.
5
Q. That was before EMI came into being?
6
A. EMl is a budding off from IEP.
7
Q. SO when was the last time you would have
8 practiced in an emergency department at St. Luke's?
9
A. 1996.
10
Q. '96, okay.
11
And have you talked to anyone specifically
12 about the practice of emergency medicine at St. Luke's in
13 20071
14
A. Yes.
15
Q. Who?
16
A. Whoever was in the emergency department when I
17 talked to them on the phone, sending patients back and
18 forth.
19
Have I ever gone to somebody in the emergency
20 department and sat down and said how do you practice
21 emergency medicine here? I haven't even done that in my
22 own institutions.
23
Q. Would you agree with me the practice of
24 emergency medicine at the VA is different than the
25 practice of emergency medicine at S1. Luke's or Saint

1 specialists, call, that sort of thing. But the
2 principles that involve diagnosis and treatment are the
3 same at all the hospitals in town.
4
Q. SO is it your testimony that the demographics
5 of the emergency patients are the same at St. Luke's and
6 Saint Ai's and the VA?
7
A. No. The demographics are not the same. TIle
8 practice of emergency medicine is the same. Patient
9 demographics are different between all hospitals.
10
MR. TOLMAN: Thank you. That's all the questions I
11 have.
12
MR. SCANLAN: Just a couple of followups.
13
14
FURTHER~ATION
15 BYMR. SCANLAN:
16
Q. You mentioned that Exhibit 4 is a redraft of
1 7 some materials that you'd gone over at Mr. Dinius's
18 office?
19
A. Yes.
20
Q. Do there exist drafts of any of these reports
21 someplace?
22
A. I don't know. This is the only -- this one is
2 3 the only one that I have. Intermediate drafts preceding
24 this, I don't know if they exist anywhere. This is the
2 5 only one that I signed. It was built from other
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1 AI's?
2
A. I would say the practice of emergency medicine
3 is different at every single hospital rve ever worked
4 at.
5
Q. But in terms of distinguishing between the two,
6 if you have patients -- generally emergency patients are
7 not transferred from Saint AI's and st. Luke's to the VA
8 on an emergent basis, correct?
9
A. Sure, they are.
10
Q. For what purpose?
11
A. They're transported back and forth between
12 hospitals. For what purpose, usually back to the VA
13 because they have VA insurance and no other insurance.
14 But, no, we transport them both ways.
15
Q. SO do ambulances deliver to 16
A. Yes, they do. And they bring patients from
1 7 other hospitals into the VA.
18
Q. Do they bring trauma patients into the -19
A. They bring some trauma. Major trauma we don't
20 even accept them. We divert the ambulance.
21
There is no essential difference in emergency
22 practice at the VA, St. Luke's, Saint AI's, Twin Falls.
23 The training of the emergency physicians is the same.
24 The facilities differ, so sometimes we use other
25 institutions for the sake of their facilities or their

6
Q. Did you send them back and forth?
7
A. No. I sat in the office to work out what this
8 contained. So as far as I know, this is the only -- this
9 and copies of this is the only draft in existence.
10
Q. Do you have any correspondence other than what
11 you've brougl1t with you here today that you've exchanged
12 with Mr. Dinius or Mr. Schlender or anybody about this
13 case?
14
A. I don't.
15
Q. Do you have any other notes other than the
16 notes that you brougl1t about your past cases relating to
17 this case?
18
A. Nary a one.
19
Q. Did you take any notes?
20
A. I migl1t have while I was drafting these
21 reports, but I don't keep those. They're gone. I throw
22 them away.
23
Q. Okay. So to the extent that you had some
24 notes, they're no longer around?
A. No. I mean, they're notes like which day they
25
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material. I mean, when you do something like this, the
drafts are really meaningless.
Q. But you didn't keep copies of any of the
working drafts?
A. No.
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you know -- I mean, had you reviewed any other medical
records before you walked into the room with Ms. Bell?
A. Yeah. So the way it works at St. Luke's is
when a patient checks in at the front desk, their name
will come up on a computer tracking board through all the
computers in the department.
The next thing that happens is I signed up for
her as her physician. That then allows me to review the
chart. The chart at that time had the initial set of
vital signs, the triage notes, including her complaints.
And it's a great system.
At that time I'm also able to click on a button
that lists all of her prior visits to the st. Luke's
emergency department -- to any of the st. Luke's,
actually. And then from that I can click on those visits
to review the chart.
And in her particular case, I clicked on the
summary to look at the prior visits that she'd been in.
And from that it seemed clear that she had been in for
similar complaints in the past.
And then I reviewed - I clicked on the most
recent visit to S1. Luke's to review that in more detail
before I went in and saw her.
Q. When you say "most recent," tell me which visit
you're talking about. Are you talking about that day?
Page 25
A. No. No. Her-Q. The previous visit?

A. Yeah, the previous visit to S1. Luke's, before
I saw her.
(Deposition Exhibit No.3 was marked.)
Q. (BY MR. DINIUS) I'm going to hand you what's
been marked Exhibit 3 and ask you if you recognize those
documents.
A. Yes, I do recognize them. Those look like the
records of the visit prior to my visit that I reviewed.
Q. And you had access to all of those records on
the computer system at St. Luke's when Janet Bell came in
on July 16th?
A. Yes.
Q. SO you knew that on the 18th of June, roughly a
month earlier, she'd been in complaining of pain in her
left arm?
A. Correct.
Q. When you walked in or prior to walking into the
room with Ms. Bell, did you know that she was homeless?
A. No.
Q. Did you learn during your interaction with her
that she was, in fact, homeless?
A. No.
Q. Nobody ever told you that?
Page 26
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1
A. Correct.
2
Q. Okay. Did you, when you entered the room,
3 speak with Ms. Bell?
4
A. Yes.
5
Q. What did she say to you?
6
A. Well, she said a lot of things during the
7 course of the normal history.
8
Q. Well, tell me what you recall her telling you.
9
A. Okay. I can start from the beginning if you'd
10 like. I recall going into the room and introducing
11 myself to her and the gentleman that was with her.

12
And then started into the normal history, which
13 I said, "So, what's been going on?"
14
She proceeded to tell me that she was concerned
15 about left arm pain that she estimated she had been
16 dealing with for about two months. She said that arOlllld
17 two months ago, she was injured. She said something

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

about she feels that she was thrown into a canal and felt
that she injured her arm at that time. She said that her
other symptoms, such as neck and shoulder pain seemed to
be getting better, but that her arm pain persisted.
She said that she was - or indicated that she
was frustrated that the prior evaluations that she had
had for that condition seemed to focus on her neck and
her shoulder. And said something to express that she was
Page 27

I

frustrated that nobody had looked at her arm to this
point in particular.
Her -- I can't remember if it was her that
mentioned a lump on her arm fIrst or whether it was the
male that was with her. But during the.course of the
history, someone had mentioned that they were concerned
that they had noticed a lump on her forearm. I don't
remember exactly how long they said it had been there.
And the gentleman that was with her actually
leaned over the bed. He was on the other side of the
bed. And leaned over and pointed to this spot that they
were concerned about, described as a lump on her arm.
She complained that she couldn't move her left
hand, that the pain was severe. She was asking for pain
medicine to treat the pain.
Q. Did you think she was seeking pain pills, I
mean, just out trying to get pain pills?
A. No.
Q. Okay. You've indicated that her friend that
was with her - and ru tell you that I believe that was
Dennis Nightengale.
A. Okay.
Q. I mean, did you see him at her deposition when
you attended?
A Yes.
Page 28
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Q. Was that the same guy that was with her in the
emergency room?
A. You know, I didn't recognize him for sure, but
he very well could have been.
Q. Okay. Did you -- outside ofhim potentially
drawing your attention to the lump on her ann, did you
get any medical history relating to Janet from him?
A. I may have. Because I remember him being
particularly helpful during the visit. As she was
crying, he would sometimes provide information.
And actually I engaged him in helping me to
convince her to let me examine her and such. He was very
helpful in that regard. So J think I probably did get
some of the history from him.
Q. During the time that you are getting the
history, had Janet told you she'd been to the Saint AI's
emergency room and she'd been to St. Luke's prior to the
day that she's seeing you?
A. No. So she mentioned that she had been
evaluated before.
Q. But she didn't tell you where?
A. Right. And when she said that, I had already
reviewed her prior visits to St. Luke's.
Q. SO you knew about that?
A. I knew about that. She didn't say anything

1 you he was concerned that the ann had gangrene in it?
2
A. No.
3
Q. Did he point out any discolored areas to you?
4
A. No.
5
Q. Did you actUally observe Janet's left ann?
6
A. Yes.
7
Q. What color was it?
8
A. It appeared nonna! color, other than somewhat
9 soiled or dirty.
10
Q. And rve seen that in the records. Tell me
11 what you mean when you say "soiled."
12
A. Just dirty.
13
Q. Did anyone during this visit on July 16th.
14 anyone in the emergency room clean Janet's left arm?
15
A. I don't believe so.
16
Q. Did you ask anybody to do that?
17
A. No.
18
Q. Why not?
19
A. I didn't see any reason to.
20
Q. Did you observe any pallor or discoloration to
21 any of the skin on Janet's left ann?
22
A. No.
23
Q. You've said that she appeared upset during the
24 visit. Tell me what you mean by that.
25
A. She was crying. She was asking for pain
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about being seen at Saint AI's.
Q. At any point during your obtaining this history
and your initial encounter with Dennis and Janet, did
either of them tell you that they were homeless?
A. No. In fact, I inquired as to their appearing
not to have had a shower for quite some time,
specifically with that concern. Because we do have
resources that we can offer homeless individuals through
our social worker. And so when I see somebody in that
sort of state, I inquire about that to see if there is
anything we can offer them.
When I asked them, or just brought up, it
appears that you haven't had a shower for a while,
assuming it's Mr. Nightengale, indicated - told me that
they had been camping and that they were on their way
home and would be able to clean up when they got there.
That was his explanation.
Q. Did Janet at any point during this encounter
where you were obtaining your history, tell you that
she'd been assaulted sometime previous?
A. Yes. So she had referred to that time where
she thought she was potentially or possibly thrown into a
canal. So I took that as being the time that she may
have been assaulted.
Q. During this visit, did Dennis at any point tell
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medicine. During our discussions on the history when we
were recounting the events that had led to her injury,
she was upset, appeared upset about the assault itself.
She, again, appeared upset when she was
mentioning her prior visits, expressing frustration that
everybody seemed to focus on her neck and shoulder.
Nobody looked at her arm. She specifically mentioned
that she was upset that nobody had done x-rays of her ann
to that point. She seemed upset about that.
Q. You indicated that she was crying. I mean, did
you ever come to any conclusion as to why she was crying?
Was it because she was upset or because she Was in pain
orboth?
A. Right. Those were the possibilities. I wasn't
exactly sure how much of each one.
Q. When you say that she was moderately
disheveled, tell me what you mean by that.
A. Disheveled is a term we use for how -- it
refers to hygiene, neatness, unkempt might be another
word to use for it.
I tend to use mild, moderate, or severely
disheveled. Someone severely disheveled would be naked
or underpants only, looks like they were just pulled in
off the street.
Someone moderately would have maybe tattered
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contacted my friend/counselor that at that time worked
there and got a bed to go from Truman to recovery.
Q. SO did you go straight from prison into Truman
Recovery?
A. Yes, by my own choice.
Q. Okay. And how long were you in prison?
A. 11 months.
Q. And what were you in prison for?
A. Assault 3.
Q. Is Assault 3 a felony?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. Had you pled guilty to that crime?
A. Yes, sir, I did.
Q. SO prior to going to prison -- was the prison
located in Newport?
A. No, sir, it was not.
Q. Where was the prison you were in?
A. It was in Wilsonville, Oregon.
Q. Prior to going to prison, where had you lived?
A. I was living on the streets.
Q. And in what city?
A. In Newport, Oregon.
Q. And for how long had you lived on the streets
in Newport prior to your time in prison?
A. I can't recall for sure exactly. Prior to
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Q. How long did you do that?
A. I can't recall exactly.
Q. Was it months, years?

A. For several months.
Q. Had you been in Truman Recovery prior to the
time that you were there after getting out of prison?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. And when had you previously been in
Truman Recovery?
A. I believe I went in there in the year of 1999.
And graduated from the program and became an assistant
counselor and residential manager.
Q. Okay. So when you managed the residential
treatment center for Truman Recovery, was that
immediately after you had, yourself, completed the
program there?
A. Shortly after.
Q. Was there a period of time in between those
where you lived someplace else?
A. Well, I completed the program, but stilt lived
in the apartments, Truman Recovery.
Q. Okay. And for how long did you live in those
apartments?
A. I can't say exactly. Maybe a couple or three
years.
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that, I did have a residence in Newport of my own.
Q. Okay. Prior to the time that you spent on the

1

street?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. The in between going from the residence
that you just mentioned to prison, was that a matter of
months or years that you were on the streets?
A. Months.
Q. Months.
Do you remember what the address was of the
residence that you had in Newport?
A. No. I believe the name of the street was
Angle, but I don't recall exactly, no.
Q. Would that be A-n-g-I-e?
A. Yes, sir, I believe so.
Q. And how long did you stay in that particular
home?
A. I believe that would have been probably maybe
two years, give or take.
Q. Okay. How about before that?
A Before that r was living in a residential -no, actually I was managing a residential treatment
center for Truman Recovery.
Q. And living there as well?
A. Yes, sir. I'was the living manager.
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Q. Between'99 and today, did you ever live
anyplace other than Boise or Newport?
A. No.
Q. You mentioned Marysville, California.
Did you live in Marysville at some point?
A. Prior to Newport.
Q. Okay. What originally brought you to Newport?
A. I had a boyfriend. His father lived there, and
we were going to stay with his father.
Q. And so did you move to Newport from Marysville?
A. Yes,Idid
Q. And before Marysville, where did you live?
A. Let me see. Sacramento.
Q. And before Sacramento?
A. Oh, God. I believe I had been back in
Fayetteville, Arkansas, for a few months, ifmy memory
serves me correctly.
Q. Did you at some point in time live in San
Diego?
A. I did.
Q. Do you remember where in the series oftime
that occurred?
A. That would be in -- around the mid '80s,
somewhere in the mid '80s.
Q. How about Ohio?
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Q. (BY MR. SCANLAN) And would you travel with the
carnival or just when it came to town you'd work with it?
A. I never traveled, no.
Q. SO it would only be when they came to town, you
would work for them for a short period of time?
A. Yeah.
Q. Now, you indicated that you spent 11 months in
prison as a result of a felony Assault 3 charge.
A.' Yes, sir.
Q. What was the circumstances of that?
A. Circumstances was I beat up a person who I know
to be a child molester from things that occurred in the
residential vicinity of Truman Recovery when I was
working there and living there. And he was sleeping in a
part where children play. And little dummy thought she
was going to take the law into her own hands, and I made
a mistake.
Q. Have you had any other felony charges?
A. I believe so, yes.
Q. Okay. And for what?
A. I can't recall exactly -- what exactly charges
that I do have. I'm sure that you have them on record.
Am I not correct?
Q. Do you remember any other felonies?
A. I know that I've had a few. I can't tell you
Page 46

which ones - what they are exactly, no.
Q. Have you ever served other time in prison?
A. No, I have not.
Q. Okay. What's the longest period of time that
you've served in a jail?
A. rm not quite sure. I believe I did a year
once, but I'm not sure.
Q. Okay. Do you remember what that was for?
A. No, I do not.
Q. Where was that?
A. I would thirik Marysville, California. rm not
quite sure again.
Q. What sort of drug charges have you had?
A. Possession, small amounts.
Q. What kind of drugs?
A. I believe they got me with heroin once and with
meth once. Maybe more than once, I'm not sure.
Q. Do you remember in what states those events
occurred in?
A. That would probably be in California. I think.
I have a minor methamphetamine charge in Oregon.
Q. And you indicated that you spent a night in
jail within the last several months?
A. Yes. And it was under the name Osburn. But I
didn't tell them to do that, they did it on their own. I
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tried to correct.
Q. Do you remember what the charges were?
A. Yeah, open container.
Q. Anything else?
A. There was, but it was dropped.
Q. What was the other charge?
A. I believe it was resisting arrest
Q. What happened in that incident?
A. I was drinking a beer, and it was in Ann
Morrison park. And you're not supposed to take your can
of beer off the grass on to the pavement And I had
forgotten and was speaking to a friend. And I sat my
beer on the top of his car, and the bicycle police came.
And they saw it there and so they said, "Hey,
is that your beer?"
And I said, "Yeah. Yes, it is."
And the one officer tried to grab the can of
beer from me and spilled it upon hisself. He became a
little angry and tried to overcharge me for that one.
Q. Since July of2oo7, have you had any other
run-ins with law enforcement?
A. Anything severe? I don't believe so.
Q. Anything at aU?
A. Just the one thing that you just mentioned.
Q. The time that you spent the night injail for
Page 48
the open container?
A. Yeah. Yeah, that's all I have, to my
knOWledge.
Q. Do you drive?
A. No.
Q. When was the last time that you had a driver's
license?
A. I've never had a driver's license, yet I was
capable of driving a vehicle. I just never obtained a
license.
Q. Have you ever had a driving under the influence
charge?
A. I believe I may have quite some time back.
Q. Justone?
A. I'm not quite sure about that. I believe
that's all, but I wouldn't guarantee it
Q. You said that the police were making things
difficult for you in Newport.
A. Correct.
Q. And that you were having trouble complying with
your parole terms, which is what one of the things that
made you come to Idaho?
A. No, sir. That wasn't exactly it. Newport is a
very small town. And it's ran by basically the tourists,
people that own the tourist traps. And they have a
Page 49
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Q. Prior to coming to Idaho, had you previously
been diagnosed with depression?
A. Yes.
Q. And had you always been previously diagnosed
with hepatitis B and hepatitis C?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know how you got hepatitis?
A. From drinking.
Q. Okay. Would that be both B and C?
A. That would probably be B. And Cwould probably
be from the drugs, I asswne.
Q. And at times, would you share needles with
people?
A. Yes.
Q. You also had previously been diagnosed with
bipolar disorder?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you get treated for that?
A. I'm working with my regular doctor. Thafs why
the recent change in my medications. There are
medications that do more than one thing at the same time.
And they can give me medications for my blood
pressure and to help me sleep that will also help me with
my bipolar.
Q. During the spring and surnmerof2007, were you
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taking any medication for your bipolar disorder?
A. Prior to the injury?
Q. Yes.
A. No, I was not. At that time, I was controlling
it through mind and will and doing pretty good, I think.
I don't know.
Q. You also have had a previous diagnosis of
hypothyroidism? Are you aware of any hypothyroidism
diagnosis?
A. If you tell me what that is, I'll tell you.
Q. Well, it's a condition that relates to your
~d
A. My thyroid is slightly low. Hyper sounds like
it would be high, though.
Q. And this is hypo, which would mean low thyroid.
A. Okay. Because my thyroid is slightly low, yes.
Q. Okay. And you've also had some kind of chronic
problems with bladder infections?
A. Yeah.
Q. Any other conditions that you can think of
having prior to your arrival here in Idaho?
A. No.
Q. Do you still smoke?
A. Yeah.
Q. Howmuchdoyousmoke?
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Around about a pack a day.
Q. And back in the spring and summer of 2007, how
much did you smoke?
A Geez, God, I don't know. Probably around the
same, I would assume. I don't know.
Q. About a pack a day?
A Yeah, I guess.
(Deposition Exhibit No.3 was marked.)
Q. (BY MR.. SCANLAN) You've been handed what's
been marked as I believe it's Exhibit 3 to your
deposition. Those are some records from Pacific Internal
Medicine.
A

A. Um-hmm.
Q. Do you recall receiving services from anyone at

Pacific Internal Medicine when you lived in Newport,
Oregon?
A. Yes. This Dr. Sayre, I saw him shortly, yes.
Q. If you turn to the second page of that
docwnent, there is a heading kind of near the top of the
page that says "General."
Do you see that?
A. Hang on. General. Yeah.
Q. And if you go down a little bit further in that
paragraph, it says, "As far as her muscles and joints are
concerned, she has pain, weakness, and numbness in the
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arms, back, hands, hips, legs, neck, and shoulders."
Do you see that?
A. Yeah.
Q. Is that something that you would have told Dr.

Watkins?
A. Is this from Dr. Watkins? 1 believe this is
from Dr. Sayre, isn't it?
Q. I believe that this is Dr. Watkins, if you look
on the third page there at the bottom.
A. I certainly don't recall.
Q. Okay. Have you ever been involuntarily
committed to a facility, either mental or drug and
alcohol facility?
A. No.
Q. Have you ever had any treatment in a mental
facility?
A. I went to Lincoln County Mental Health at one
time in Newport.
THE REPORTER: What was the name?
THE WI1NESS: Lincoln County Mental Health.
Q. (BY MR. SCANLAN) And was that something you
did voluntarily?
A. Yes.
Q. What sort of treatment did you receive there?
A. They were treating me for bipolar. We had some
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

JANET BELL NIGHTENGALE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JASON QUINN, M.D.; IDAHO
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, P.A.;
KEVIN MATTHEW TIMMEL, M.D.; AND
EMERGENCY MEDICINE OF IDAHO,
PA AND ITS AFFILIATES,

Case No. CV OC 0722814
DEFENDANT KEVIN TIMMEL, MD'S
JOINDER IN DEFENDANTS JASON
QUINN, MD'S AND IDAHO EMERGENCY
PHYSICIANS, PA'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE

Defendants.

COMES NOW the defendant, Kevin Timmel, MD, by and through his counsel of
record, Steven K. Tolman of Tolman & Brizee, P.C., and hereby joins in, and adopts the
arguments of, defendants Jason Quinn, MD's and Idaho Emergency Physicians, PA's
motions in limine with respect to requiring plaintiff to provide notice to opposing counsel
of any intent to use portions of depositions in opening, and precluding plaintiff or Dennis
Nightengale from offering any testimony regarding statements made to them by nonparty medical providers that were not for the purpose of medical treatment or diagnosis.

DEFENDANT KEVIN TIMMEL, MD'S JOINDER IN DEFENDANTS JASON QUINN, MD'S AND
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702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 395-8500
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585
W:\14\ 14-200.605\Limine.Opp.Memo.doc

Attorneys for Defendant Jason Quinn, M.D. and Idaho Emergency Physicians P.A.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

JANET BELL NIGHTENGALE,
Case No. CV OC 0722814
Plaintiff,
vs.
JASON QUINN, M.D.; IDAHO
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, P.A.; AND
KEVIN MATTHEW TIMMEL, M.D.,

JASON QUINN, M.D.'S
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN
LIMINE

Defendants.

COMES NOW, defendant Jason Quinn, M.D. ("Dr. Quinn"), by and through his counsel
of record, Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, PLLC, and submits this Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiff s Motion in Limine.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff has filed a Motion in Limine seeking to preclude certain evidence from trial,
including: that plaintiffs arterial occlusion was caused by IV drug abuse; plaintiffs drug and
alcohol use after her amputation; plaintiffs medical records prior to June 1, 2007; plaintiffs
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criminal history; Dr. Draper's opinion that Dr. Quinn's care and treatment of plaintiff complied
with the applicable standard of care; any testimony from Dr. Shea as to the standard of care
applicable to emergency medicine physicians; Myron Marx, M.D.'s opinions regarding what an
ultrasound would and would not have shown on July 11, 2007; Dr. Henry's standard of care
opinions; and comments on the scope or effect of this lawsuit on the healthcare system and/or
defendants' medical practices. For the reasons discussed below, plaintiffs motion in limine
should be denied, or at the least, tabled until trial.
II. ARGUMENT
A.

IV Drug Abuse as a Potential Cause of Plaintiff's Arterial Occlusion is Relevant
In an attempt to preclude defendants from offering any evidence or testimony regarding

the IV drug abuse as a potential cause of plaintiff s arterial occlusion, plaintiff makes two
arguments that both fail because the cause of plaintiff s arterial occlusion, or possible cause, is
relevant to this case.
First, plaintiff argues that the cause of the arterial occlusion is irrelevant because
defendants are precluded from arguing comparative fault against plaintiff based on her pre July
11, 2007 I.V. drug use. Dr. Quinn concedes plaintiffs actions that may have lead to causing her
condition as of July 11, 2007 are not proper subjects of comparative fault, and has no intention of
arguing the same at trial; however, the cause ofplaintiffs occlusion is relevant with regard to Dr.
Quinn's medical decision making process and ultimate conclusions. Further, the probative value
of such evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
1.

The Cause or Potential Causes of Plaintiff's Arterial Occlusion are
Relevant
a. Dr. Quinn considered plaintiff's prior drug use and its potential
role in the plaintiff's presentation.
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Dr. Quinn saw plaintiff on July 11, 2007. Mrs. Nightengale complained of pain in her
left ann that had been present for a couple of months, and explained to Dr. Quinn the pain was
not any different than it had been over the course of the prior couple of weeks. Plaintiff had
multiple scars on her left ann believed to be from her admitted fonner heavy IV drug injection
into that ann. See Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion in Limine ("Counsel
Aff") Ex A (SARMC medical records from July 11, 2007). Plaintiff infonned Dr. Quinn she
had not used IV drugs for a couple of years. Neither Dr. Quinn nor the nurse could locate a
radial pulse. Jd. Plaintiffs capillary refill in her fingertips, however, was within normal limits as
measured by the paramedics who transported her to the Emergency Department, the nurse who
first saw plaintiff in the E.D., and Dr. Quinn. See Ex. B (Ada County Paramedics Records). Dr.
Quinn also observed plaintiffs complaints of pain were inconsistent, plaintiff had full range of
motion with her ann, her hand was nonnal color and she was able to use her ann regularly. See
Counsel Aff. Ex. A. Dr. Quinn's Emergency Department record states:
I do not feel she has an acute vascular emergency. I suspect the decreased
pulses are likely related to chronic drug abuse in that arm and scar tissue. Given
that she has nonnal capiIlary refill, I am not sure why her pulses are low. It may
be related to prior drug use. At this point, I do not feel she has evidence of an
acute arterial injury, she states the symptoms had been going on for many months
and her exam is very inconsistent here ... At this time, I feel the patient can be
safely discharged without further studies.
Plaintiff had adequate blood flow to her hand as of Dr. Quinn's examination of her on
July 11, 2007, as revealed by her nonnal capillary refill tests. (See 7111107 Record; Dr. Henry
Depo., pp. 78-79, 11. 13-25). So long as a patient's hand is adequately vascularized, there is not
an emergency situation and the problem does not need to be addressed in the Emergency
Department. (Dr. Henry Depo), p. 58,11.6-17.
Plaintiffs expert Richard Lally, M.D. has opined the standard of care reqUIres an
emergency physician order vascular studies when faced with a patient with lack of a radial pulse
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and arm pain, and that Dr. Quinn breached such standard. As stated above, in Dr. Quinn's
Emergency Department Report, Dr. Quinn considered plaintiff s lack of radial pulse and
indicated it may be due to her chronic drug use (that can damage arteries and veins and restrict
blood flow)] or resulting scarring (which can make detection of pulses more difficult). The fact
that Dr. Quinn specifically considered plaintiff s prior drug use in his treatment of plaintiff as
well as his ultimate conclusion that plaintiff did not have an acute vascular emergency is clearly
relevant.

b. Plaintiff's prior drug use is a part of the history and provides an
explanation for the manner in which plaintiff presented
As seen throughout plaintiff s medical records, both pre and post amputation, her drug
use is a part of her medical history and cannot be excluded without unfairly prejudicing Dr.
Quinn and Dr. Timmel, who treated Mrs. Nightengale for her presenting conditions, which
necessarily included discussion and consideration of her drug use history.

c. Plaintiff provided other explanations for the cause of her problem
that may have mislead the healthcare providers
Throughout the course of June and July 2007, plaintiff provided varying explanations of
the cause of her arm pain to the various medical providers who saw her, including: an injury ten
years prior, caused by an alleged assault that occurred on June 1, 2007 and involved being struck
by a rock and thrown into a canal, and a hangnail. See Counsel Aff., Ex. L (various medical
records from June 1, 2007, July 16, 2007 and July 20, 2007 regarding causes of injury).
Therefore, the cause of plaintiffs arterial occlusion, or at least plaintiffs comments regarding

I Dr. Henry testified in his deposition that it is not uncommon for IV drug users to damage their arteries and that in
his belie( plaintiffs IV drug use combined with other causes, resulted in a process whereby plaintiff had a chronic
inflammation of her vessels resulting in long term chronic partial occlusion. See Counsel Aff. Ex C. (Dr. Henry
Depo.), pp. 61-72)
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her own condition, including her thoughts of potential causes is also relevant in that it may have
made diagnosis of her left arm pain more difficult.
2.

The Probative Value of the Prior IV Drug Use Would Not Lead to Unfair
Prejudice

Second, plaintiff argues that whatever probative value such evidence has is substantially
outweighed by unfair prejudice plaintiff would incur if it was revealed to the jury she was an IV
drug user.

Plaintiffs prior IV drug use is relevant and has probative value, as it was an

appropriate 2 factor considered and relied upon by Dr. Quinn in his diagnosis of plaintiff and
determination she was not experiencing an acute vascular event.
Further, plaintiff would not incur unfair prejudice if the jury learns of her IV drug use as
a result of testimony or evidence as to her IV drug abuse causing her occlusion, as such
information is clearly relevant, and admissible on numerous issues, including the fact it resulted
in significant scarring on her left foreann, was appropriately considered by Dr. Quinn in his
medical decision making regarding his diagnosis of plaintiff on July 11, 2007 and affects her life
expectancy. Ultimately, the fact of her drug use is part of the relevant medical records and her
treatment and it must be shared with the jury. The fact that it may have been a factor in bringing
about the medical problem in this case will not be unfairly prejudicial as the jury will already be
aware of her prior drug use.
B.

Plaintiff's Drug or Alcohol Use After July 20, 2007 is Relevant
Plaintiff asks the Court to exclude any mention of plaintiffs drug or alcohol use after the

date of her amputation, arguing such information is irrelevant. This argument again fails, as

Plaintiffs own expert Dr. Draper has opined that Dr. Quinn "documented a highly likely cause of decreased pulse
in the left arm which could exist in the absence of signs of ischemia (history of heavy IV drug use with scar tissue
obscuring a pulse.") See Counsel Aff. Ex. 0 (Dr. Draper September 18, 2007 Report,) p. 9).
2
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plaintiff s continued alcohol use continues to affect her physical condition, and because her
continued alcohol and drug use is relevant to her life expectancy.
In late July 2007, plaintiff broke her leg, and was confined to a wheel chair. Plaintiff was
walking down a hill by Ann Morrison Park, fell and broke her leg. At the time of the fall,
plaintiff was "intoxicated on alcohol as well as marijuana." See Counsel Aff. Ex. E (SLRMC
records dated July 22, 2009).
To the extent plaintiff intends to allege her fall was somehow related to her amputation,
the fact she was drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana just prior to the fall is certainly
relevant.
Further, plaintiffs admitted continued use of marijuana is relevant to her credibility.
Specifically, plaintiff testified she only uses marijuana for her chronic pain:
Q:

But I believe you were asked if you used marijuana in 2008. And you said
yes.

A:

Yeah.

Q:

Have you used it in 2009?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Because I thought you said you were taking it because of the pain.

A:

Yes.

Q:

And for whatever other reason?

A:

No, not whatever other reason.

See Counsel Aff. Ex. F. (Janet Nightengale Depo) p. 149, II. 3-12.
Mr. Nightengale, however, testified his wife's last two uses of marIjUana were on a
camping/fishing trip with him and New Year's Eve with one of her friends. See Counsel Aff. Ex.
G. (Dennis Nightengale Depo), pp. 44-46, 11. 20-4.
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Plaintiffs continued use of alcohol and drugs is relevant to the instant action as far as it
relates to plaintiffs broken leg and her credibility. Further, such information is relevant to the
extent it bears on her life expectancy. As such, plaintiffs motion should be denied. At the very
least, the Court should defer ruling on this matter until trial.
C.

Plaintiff's Prior Medical Records Are Relevant and Should Be Admitted

Plaintiff argues these records are irrelevant because they are in no way relevant to the
condition with which plaintiff presented on July 11 or July 16, 2007.

However, plaintiffs

alleged damages are so broad as to include numerous items plaintiff suffered prior to defendants'
involvement.
To date, defendants are still unclear as to the extent of plaintiff's claimed damages.
Plaintiff was asked in discovery to itemize her damages by description and amount. To date, the
only response has been "Damages will include all those allowed by Idaho statutory and case law,
including losses for pain and suffering, humiliation and disfigurement, as well as earnings loss
yet to be completed. This response will be supplemented accordingly." See Counsel Aff. Ex. H
(Plaintiff's Responses to Defendants Jason Quinn M.D., and Idaho Emergency Physicians,
P.A. 's First Set ofInterrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents to Plaintiff.), p. 9.
Plaintiffs disclosed Nancy Collins as an expert in this case. Her report states "[b]ecause [Mrs.
Nightengale] cannot participate in many activities she used to enjoy she has gained weight and
often feels fatigued." Ms. Collins' report also states that as a result of defendants' care plaintiff
has been depressed.
A review of plaintiff s previous medical records indicates plaintiff had complained of
chronic fatigue and depression long before July 2007. See Counsel Aff. Ex. 1. As such, the
previous medical records are relevant to establish preexisting conditions for which defendants
are not liable.
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Further, plaintiffs prior medical records are relevant for the purpose of establishing
plaintiff does not have an average life expectancy.

Plaintiffs experts Nancy Collins and

Cornelius Hofman have offered reports related to life care plans and damages based upon the
average woman's life expectancy. Plaintiff, however, is not an average female living in the
United States. Rather, she has lived as a homeless person for a good portion of her life, and
suffers from hepatitis B, hepatitis C, bipolar disorder, depression, and Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder. Plaintiffs medical records further reveal that she has engaged in high risk behavior,
such as sharing of needles and exchanging sex for drugs and/or money. See Counsel Aff. Ex. 1.
All of this information is relevant with regard to plaintiffs life expectancy, and how it is shorter
than that of an average female.
Additionally, her past medical records demonstrate patterns of inconsistent stories
relayed to health care providers and contradictory histories that are relevant to the histories
provided in this case and her credibility. Additionally, to the extent she contradicts her prior
records, they are relevant for impeachment purposes.
The previous medical records of plaintiff are relevant for purposes of showing previously
existing physical conditions as well as a less than average life expectancy. Additionally, they are
relevant for purposes of demonstrating her lack of credibility and for impeachment purposes.
D.

Previous Crimes May Be Inquired Into on Cross-Examination of Plaintiff

Dr. Quinn concedes that, at this point in time, evidence of plaintiff s known criminal
convictions is not admissible; however, some of plaintiff s previous crimes may be inquired into
on cross examination, as they concern her character for truthfulness and untruthfulness.
In her deposition, plaintiff testified that she has "been known to shoplift from stores on
occasion." See Counsel Aff. Ex. F (pp. 65-66, 11. 20-1). Further, plaintiff testified she has
engaged in numerous acts of theft:
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Q:

Okay. Tell me about the times that you have been charged with theft.

A:

Let's see. I believe there was once in San Diego, would have been
National City, actually, which is San Diego Country.

Q:

And what had you stolen there?

A:

Some groceries from a store.

Q:

Okay. Any others that you remember?

A:
Yeah. Actually, I believe there was twice down there. There was one in
Chula Vista as well. There would be a couple of minor, petty thefts, I believe, in
Marysville.

ld, (pp. 54-55, II. 24-12).
Idaho Rule of Evidence 608(b), states "[s]pecific instances of the conduct of a witness,
for the purpose of attacking or supporting the credibility, of the witness, other than conviction of
crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in
the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on
cross-examination of the witness .... "
Idaho appellate courts have not specifically addressed whether specific instances of
shoplifting are probative of a witnesses' untruthfulness. Idaho Courts have addressed the issue
of whether crimes of burglary, larceny and robbery are relevant to credibility for Idaho Rule of
Evidence 609 evaluations: "On the other hand robbery, larceny, and burglary, while not showing
a propensity to falsify, do disclose a disregard for the rights of other which might reasonably be
expected to express itself in giving false testimony whenever it would be to the advantage of the
witness." State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 631, 977 P.2d 890, 893 (1999) (emphasis added);
see also State v. Pierce, 107 Idaho 96, 103,685 P.2d 837,844 (1984) (holding that a conviction

for robbery may bear on the issue of "whether [the witness] would hesitate to testify untruthfully
if it seemed advantageous to do so.") (emphasis added). In the instant action, plaintiffs fomler

JASON QUINN, M.D.'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINEQ.

q0451

acts of theft and shoplifting are relevant to her truthfulness because she, as the plaintiff, has an
opportunity to obtain an advantage in this case by being untruthful on the stand.
Other courts have addressed the specific issue of whether shoplifting is probative of a
witness's credibility. Although it appears foreign jurisdictions are not uniform, many have found
that shoplifting or petit theft are probative of truthfulness. See People v. Segovia, 196 P.3d 1126,
1132 (Colo.2008)(holding "shoplifting is a specific instance of conduct that is probative of
truthfulness pursuant to CRE 608(b).") see also United States v. Smith, 80 F.3d 1188,1193 (7 th
Cir.1996) (theft is probative of truthfulness); State v. Fields, 730 N.W.2d 777,783 (Minn.2007)
(theft); Shumpert v. State, 935 So.2d 962, 971-72 (Miss.2006) (theft); State v. Hurlburt, 132
N.H. 674, 569 A.2d 1306, 1307 (1990) (misappropriation); State v. Wyman, 96 N.M. 558, 632
P.2d 1196, 1197-98 (Ct.App.l981) (theft). The Segovia court went on to explain "[i)t is illogical
to conclude that an act which involves dishonesty is at the same time an act that is not probative
of truthfulness. Moreover, common experience informs us that a person who takes the property
of another for her own benefit is acting in an untruthful or dishonest way." Id. Idaho courts are
likely to reach similar conclusions, particularly in light of the existing rulings regarding more
serious theft crimes, such as robbery.
As such, plaintiff's admissions of shoplifting and theft may be inquired into during crossexamination for purposes of impeaching her credibility pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence
608(b), and plaintiff's Motion in Limine should be denied.
E.

Dr. Quinn Should be Allowed to Call Dr. Draper in His Case in Chief, or Cross
Examine Him as To Opinions He Holds Regarding Dr. Quinn's Care

Dr. Quinn addressed this matter fully in his Memorandum in Support of Motions in
Limine, and incorporates those arguments in this Opposition as if fully set forth herein. Dr.
Quinn will not reargue those same points here, but will only address plaintiff's argument.
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First, Dr. Quinn would like to address a misstatement in plaintiffs factual setup of her
argument.

Dr. Quinn did not object to plaintiffs original expert disclosure of Dr. Draper.

Rather, Dr. Quinn objected only to Dr. Lally's disclosure. Further, Dr. Quinn did not request the
prior supplementations of Dr. Draper be stricken. In fact, Dr. Quinn has objected to plaintiffs
Fifth Expert Disclosure of Dr. Draper to the extent it intends to replace previously disclosed
opinions of Dr. Draper.
Second, plaintiff appears to argue the Court's July 13, 2009 Memorandum Decision
struck or somehow allowed them to replace the prior expert disclosures. As stated in the
Memorandum Decision, however, "the Court will order the following: Doctors Draper and Lally
must submit supplemental reports .... " (p. 9). The Court's Memorandum Decision did not
strike the previous disclosures, it simply required plaintiff to make a supplemental disclosure that
complied with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4).
Plaintiff appears to argue Dr. Draper has been retained as a testifying expert with regard
to Dr. Timmel and as a non-testifying expert with regard to his opinions as to Dr. Quinn, and that
Dr. Draper is, therefore, entitled to protection under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(B).
Dr. Quinn acknowledges that, typically a defendant may not call an expert witness who is
retained by plaintiff, but not expected to testify, however, Dr. Quinn strongly disputes that Dr.
Draper qualifies as a consulting witness when he is expected to testify at trial, and his opinions
have already been disclosed.
Dr. Draper has been disclosed as a standard of care expert with regard to emergency
medicine providers practicing in Boise, Idaho in July 2007. As the Court is aware, both Dr.
Quinn and Dr. Timmel are emergency medicine providers who, as of July 2007, were practicing
in Boise, Idaho. Dr. Draper, as an emergency medicine expert, clearly has opinions he intends to
offer regarding the standard of care applicable to Dr. Timmel. In the event Dr. Draper offers
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such opinions, plaintiff has opened the door for any questioning with regard to standard of care
issues for an emergency medicine physician practicing in Boise, including those as to Dr.
Quinn's care and treatment of plaintiff. In other words, it is not possible for plaintiff to limit the
scope of Dr. Draper's direct testimony as to only standard of care for Dr. Timmel, as Drs. Quinn
and Timmel are subject to the same standard of care.
Dr. Draper's opinion that Dr. Quinn's care and treatment of plaintiff complied with the
applicable standard of care will help the jury resolve a disputed issue in this case and is therefore
clearly relevant. Dr. Draper has been disclosed as having opinions as to both Dr. Quinn and Dr.
Timme!, and only now, has plaintiff attempted to improperly limit the scope of Dr. Draper's
opinions. It is anticipated plaintiff will argue defendants have done the same thing by selecting
experts to testify only as to Dr. Quinn or Dr. Timme!. However, Dr. Quinn and Dr. Timmel have
their own right to defend themselves in this lawsuit as they see fit, which includes, retention of
their own experts. Defendants' experts were not asked to form opinions as to other providers,
and have not done so. Dr. Draper was asked to opine as to both Dr. Quinn's and Dr. Timmel's
care and treatment. Dr. Draper provided such opinions and plaintiff disclosed such opinions in
this case.
In the event Dr. Draper testifies, Dr. Quinn should be allowed to cross examine him
regarding his standard of care opinions applicable to emergency medicine physicians practicing
in Boise, Idaho in July 2007, which includes his opinions as to Dr. Quinn's care and treatment of
plaintiff.

F.

Dr. Marx's Opinion as to What an Ultrasound Would Have Revealed on July 11,
2007 is Proper and Admissible
Myron Marx, M.D. is a board certified interventional radiologist. Dr. Quinn identified

Dr. Marx's opinions in his original disclosure of expert witnesses. Plaintiff moves the Court to
preclude Dr. Marx from offering two of his offered opinions in this case: (1) his opinion as to
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causation of the injury and (2) his expert opinion as to what an ultrasound test would have shown
on July 11,2007, had one been performed.
As for Dr. Marx's causation opinions, plaintiff makes the same arguments addressed
above in section A.
Plaintiff then argues Dr. Marx's testimony regarding what an ultrasound would have
shown on July 11, 2007, had one been done, is speculative and unsupported by the facts.
Plaintiff's arguments are misplaced.
Dr. Quinn's disclosure of Dr. Marx includes the following statements:
Dr. Marx is anticipated to opine that, more probably than not, had an ultrasound
study been performed on July 11,2007, at the time Mrs. Nightengale was seen by
Dr. Quinn, it would have demonstrated sufficient blood flow in the arm and hand.
(See Jason Quinn, M.D. and Idaho Emergency Physicians, P.A.'s Disclosure of
Expert Witnesses)
Dr. Marx is an interventional radiologist.

A part of his job includes reading and

interpreting ultrasounds such as the one he describes above. Based upon Dr. Marx's review of
the record, including the fact plaintiff's hand was of normal color, she had normal use of her
arm, full range of motion in her arm, IV drug scarring on her forearm, and normal capillary refill
throughout her hand, Dr. Marx has opined that had an ultrasound have been performed on July
11, 2007, it would have shown sufficient blood flow.

Dr. Marx's opinion is not mere

speculation. Rather, it is his expert opinion based upon his training, experience, and education
coupled with his review of the records in this case.
Interestingly, plaintiff's own expert, Richard Lally, M.D., also offers an opinion on what
an ultrasound would have shown if it had been done on July 11, 2007: "In my opinion, further
vascular studies would have detected the arterial occlusion." See Plaintiff's Fifth Supplemental
Expert Disclosure, Dr. Lally Report p. 3).

While Dr. Lally likely lacks the training and
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experIence to reach such a conclusion, it appears plaintiff plans to seek to introduce such
testimony.
Dr. Marx's opinion as to what an ultrasound would have shown on July 11, 2007 is not
inadmissible speculation, but is rather an opinion held to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty based upon the facts of this case, his education, training and experience. In the event
the Court is inclined to grant plaintiff's Motion in Limine on this ground, it must also preclude
plaintiff's experts from offering similar opinions.

G.

Dr. Henry Has Adequately Familiarized Himself With the Local Standard of
Care for Dr. Quinn
Plaintiff argues Dr. Henry failed to identify how he had sufficient knowledge of the local

standard of care applicable to Dr. Quinn, and is therefore not qualitled to offer standard of care
opinions at trial. An actual review of Dr. Quinn's testimony, however, as opposed to plaintiff's
summary, reveals Dr. Henry is adequately familiar with the standard of care and qualified to
offer standard of care opinions in this case.
Dr. Henry testified that he discussed the standard of care applicable to Dr. Quinn with Dr.
Beardmore:
Q:

It's indicated in your disclosure that you discussed the applicable standard
of care with an emergency room physician that was familiar with the
standard of care applicable to Dr. Quinn in this case. Is that true?

A:

Yes. That is true.

Q:

Who did you speak with?

A:

I believe he's Dr. Beardmore or - that's his name, I believe.

(See Counsel Aff. Ex. C), p. 24, 11. 10-18.
Dr. Henry testified that Dr. Beardmore was an emergency medicine physician who
practiced in the Boise area.
Q:

Do you know if Dr. Beardmore is an emergency physician?
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A:

Yes, he is.

***
Q:

Okay. Do you know where he practices?

A:

All I know is it's in the state of Idaho. Now I can't tell you exactly which
hospital it's at. All I know is he is from the state of Idaho, and I believe
he's somewhere in the Boise area, but I'm not-I can't tell you which
hospital he works at.

See Counsel Aff. Ex. C, p. 27, 11. 5-17.

Dr. Henry testified about his discussion with Dr. Beardmore, including that it lasted
approximately 45 minutes to an hour and involved:
the flow of patients, how they would be triaged, how they would be seen, what
would constitute an emergent intervention, what would constitute follow-up care,
what would constitute a reasonable physical examination given a patient with a
certain set of medical problems and a certain condition. What would, what would
you do with the following kind of case? And so that's, that's how we establish
what would be done where I am, what would be done where he is, and pretty
much that's how that conversation went. And it went on for about I'd say fortyfive minutes to an hour or so.
See Counsel Aff. Ex. C, pp. 27-28,11. 18-8.

Further, there is nothing precluding Dr. Quinn from having Dr. Henry revisit a discussion
with Dr. David Beardmore in the event his memory needs to be refreshed with regard to the fact
that Dr. Beardmore is an emergency room physician who, as of July 11, 2007, was practicing at
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, in Boise, Idaho.
Plaintiff argues that the fact Dr. Henry had formed his initial opinions in this case prior to
speaking with a local physician somehow invalidates his expert opinions. As the Court is fully
aware, the purpose of having the out of state expert confer with a local physician is to confirm
the out of state witness is familiar with the local standard. This is typically done by establishing
that the local standard of care is without any deviations (or identifying any that may exists) as
compared to the standard familiar to the out of state expert.

Therefore, the fact Dr. Henry
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developed his opinions prior to confirming the standard of care applicable to Dr. Quinn was the
same as the standard of care he is familiar with is of no consequence whatsoever.
Finally, Dr. Henry has read Dr. Quinn's deposition in this matter. An out of state expert
may acquaint him or herself with the applicable standard of care by reading depositions of local
physicians. See Kozlowski v. Rush, 121 Idaho 825, 838-839, 828 P.2d 854,857-858 (1992). Dr.
Quinn testified in his deposition that "[s]o in this case, no, I don't think the standard of care - I
don't think the standard of care would have been any different anywhere else." See Counsel Aff.
Ex. K (Dr. Quinn Depo), p., 76, 11. 4-9.
As such, Dr. Henry is familiar with the standard of care applicable to Dr. Quinn through
his discussions with Dr. Beardmore, as well as his review of Dr. QUinn's own deposition
testimony indicating that the Boise standard of care is the same as the national standard of care
with regard to his treatment of plaintiff.

H.

Various Issues
Plaintiff identifies eight statements or topics she wants to preclude defendants from

making. Dr. Quinn has no objection to the first seven; however, Dr. Quinn does oppose item (g)
which would preclude Dr. Quinn from calling the instant action a medical malpractice case. Dr.
Quinn primarily objects to this as it is inconsequential, but fears it may be difficult to avoid
reference to this matter as a medical malpractice case throughout the course of trial.
DATED this

day of September, 2009.

HALL,FARLEY,OBERRECHT
& BLANTON, P.A.

r Defendant Jason Quinn, M.D.
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TOLMAN & BRIZEE, P.C.
132 3rd Avenue East
P.O. Box 1276
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1276
Telephone: (208) 733-5566
Attorney for Defendant Kevin Timmel, MD

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

JANET BELL NIGHTENGALE,
Case No. CV OC 0722814

Plaintiff,
vs.
JASON QUINN, M.D.; IDAHO
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, P.A.;
KEVIN MATTHEW TIMMEL, M.D.; AND
EMERGENCY MEDICINE OF IDAHO,
PA AND ITS AFFILIATES,

DEFENDANT KEVIN TIMMEl, M.Do'S
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTIONS IN LIMINE

Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
COMES NOW, defendant Kevin Timmel, MD (hereinafter referred to as "Dr.
Timmel"), by and through his counsel of record, Tolman & Brizee, P.C., and submits his
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motions in Limine. These motions are made and
based upon the record herein, the Idaho Rules of Evidence, and the following law and
argument.
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ARGUMENT
A.

Plaintiff's Experts Should Be Precluded From Providing Opinions at
Trial Not Previously Disclosed and Provided in Written Disclosures.

Dr. Timmel previously filed a motion to exclude plaintiff's expert witnesses Dr.
Draper and Dr. Lally, and a motion to strike plaintiff's second supplemental expert
disclosure, based upon the fact the disclosures were untimely, deficient, and not in
compliance with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4). The Court, in its Memorandum
Decision, dated the 13th day of July, 2009, agreed with Dr. Timmel and concluded the
disclosures were deficient. However, the Court allowed the plaintiff an opportunity to
resubmit the reports of Drs. Draper and Lally, instructing plaintiff to comply with Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(A){i).
Plaintiff has resubmitted the expert disclosures for both of her expert witnesses,
Dr. Draper and Dr. Lally. Moreover, Dr. Timmel argues the Court cannot permit or aI/ow
Dr. Draper and Dr. Lally to provide any testimony or opinion(s) at trial regarding Dr.
Timmel which have not been previously disclosed by written disclosure, pursuant to this
Court's Scheduling Order, dated January 8, 2009, and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(4)(A}(i). In other words, plaintiff's expert witnesses are limited to testifying
regarding their respective opinions as provided in plaintiff's expert disclosures.
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Idaho case law support Dr. Timmel's
position that plaintiff's expert witnesses can only testify regarding opinions and
information provided in plaintiffs expert disclosures. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e)
provides, in relevant part:
(1) A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement the response with
DEFENDANT KEVIN TIMMEL. M.D.'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS IN LlMINEt.
PAGE 2

OOu467

respect to any question directly addressed to ... (8) the identity of each
person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the subject
matter on which the person is expected to testify, and the substance of
the persona's testimony.
I.R.C.P. 26(e)(1}.
"This rule unambiguously imposes a continuing duty to supplement responses to
discovery with respect to the substance and subject matter of an expert's testimony
where the initial responses have been rejected, modified, expanded upon, or otherwise
altered in some manner." Radmer v. Ford Motor Company, 120 Idaho 86, 89, 813 P.2d
897, 900 (1991) (citing Zolber v. Winters, 109 Idaho 824, 712 P.2d 525 (1986). In
Radmer v. Ford Motor Company, the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the Advisory

Committee Notes for Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, which is analogous to Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 26, and both rules are designed to promote candor and fairness.
Id.

The federal Advisory Committee stated:
"In cases of this character [involving expert testimony], a prohibition
against discovery of information held by expert witnesses produces in
acute form the very evils that discovery has been created to prevent.
Effective cross-examination of an expert witness requires advance
preparation . . . Similarly, effective rebuttal requires advance
knowledge of the line of testimony of the other side. If the latter is
foreclosed by a rule against discovery, the narrowing of issues and
elimination of surprise which discovery normally produces are frustrated."
Id. (quoting Advisory Committee Notes, Rule 26, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure., 28

u.s.e.A.) (emphasis added); see also Clark v.

Raty, 137 Idaho 343, 347,48 P.3d 672,

676 (2002).
The Idaho Supreme Court also noted the critical nature of complete and accurate
responses regarding expert witnesses in the discovery process in preparation for trial,
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noting:
"It is fundamental that opportunity be had for full cross-examination, and
this cannot be done properly in many cases without resort to pretrial
discovery, particularly when expert witnesses are involved ... Before an
attorney can even hope to deal on cross-examination with an
unfavorable expert opinion he must have some idea of the bases of
that opinion and the data relied upon. If the attorney is required to
await examination at trial to get this information. he often will have
too little time to recognize and expose vulnerable spots in the
testimony."
Id. (quoting Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14

Stan.LRev. 455, 485 (1962) (emphasis added).
The Radmer court held that if a party fails to satisfy the requirements of Idaho Rule
of Civil Procedure 26, then typically the trial court excludes the proffered evidence. Id.
(citing Cole co Industries, Inc. v. Berman, 567 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1977». Since trial courts
have broad discretion in ruling on pre-trial discovery matters, "reversible error has been
found in allowing testimony where Rule 26 has not been complied with." Id. (citing Smith v.
Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1980». Specifically, in Radmer, the Idaho

Supreme Court concluded the trial court committed reversible error in aI/owing the
testimony of an expert witness at trial after the Supreme Court determined that "[the
plaintiffs] breached their obligation to supplement their discovery responses prior to trial,
as required by rule 26, and as a result [the defendant] was unprepared to meet and
effectively challenge [the plaintiffs'] new theory of liability and was prejudiced thereby." Id.,
120 Idaho at 91, 813 P.2d at 902.

The Idaho Supreme Court has held expert witnesses may only testify at trial
regarding opinions, facts, and information which are properly disclosed. In Clark v. Raty,
137 Idaho 343, 48 P.3d 672 (2002), the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
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exclusion of trial testimony provided by plaintiffs expert witness relating to information
which plaintiff untimely disclosed. In Clark, the plaintiff identified treating physicians,
including a Dr. Scoville, as potential witnesses. Id., 137 Idaho at 344, 48 P.3d at 673.
However, plaintiff did not state any medical opinions to which Dr. Scoville was expected
to testify nor offer any facts to support those opinions. Id. Two weeks prior to trial, the
defendants filed a motion in limine requesting preclusion of expert testimony regarding
any opinions that had not been disclosed in plaintiff's discovery responses. Id.
One week prior to trial, at a hearing on defendant's motion in limine, the trial
court determined plaintiff's expert witness disclosure relating to Dr. Scoville's testimony
and expert opinion was deficient. but permitted plaintiff to cure Dr. Scoville's expert
disclosure and set a deadline for the plaintiffs supplemental disclosure prior to trial. Id.
The plaintiff supplemented the disclosure of Dr. Scoville's testimony and opinions prior
to the trial setting. but two days after the court established deadline. Id.
One day prior to the commencement of trial, the district court held that "because
of [plaintiffs] untimely disclosure, he would not be allowed to present Dr. Scoville's
opinion regarding the [information and opinions found in the updated supplemental
disclosure]." Id., 137 Idaho at 345, 48 P.3d at 674. However, the trial court held
plaintiffs expert witness, Dr. Scovil/e, would be allowed to testify about matters that had
already been timely disclosed in accordance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
The trial court specifically stated, "to the extent that [the plaintiff has] made the
disclosures as to Dr. Scoville appropriately, if any, then [the plaintiff] can use [Dr.
Scovil/e]. If not, then I think [the plaintiff is] restricted to what [Dr. Scovil/e] can say in
terms of facts." Id., 137 Idaho at 348, 48 P.3d at 677. The trial court specifically
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prohibited the parties from eliciting evidence of "any of the new opinions of Dr. Scoville
not previously disclosed." Id. (emphasis part of original).
In affirming the trial court's decision to exclude the trial testimony of plaintiffs
untimely-disclosed opinions of his expert witness, Dr. Scoville, the Idaho Supreme Court
noted U[i]t is clear that the district court intended only to preclude opinions and
supporting data that had not been disclosed in discovery responses .... [and] excluded
only Dr. Scoville's untimely-disclosed opinions and underlying data, but expressly
allowed Dr. Scoville's testimony as to any facts or opinions that had been disclosed in
response to discovery." Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court has also prohibited expert witnesses from providing
opinions at trial in medical malpractice cases, where such opinions have not previously
been disclosed and provided in written disclosures. In Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 45
P.3d 810 (2002), the Supreme Court held that a party's failure to timely supplement
discovery responses, including disclosure of the identity of an expert witness and
disclosure of the substance of the expert's testimony concerning an opinion
regarding the applicable standard of care, warranted exclusion of the expert's testimony
at trial. Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 158-159, 45 P.3d 810, 814-815 (2002). The
Supreme Court reasoned exclusion of the expert testimony was proper because the
opposing party did not have an opportunity to prepare cross-examination or to offer
rebuttal testimony. Id., 137 Idaho at 159,45 P.3d at 815.
Presently, in the above-entitled case, plaintiff has timely supplemented her expert
witness disclosures to Dr. Timmel and the Court. However, based upon the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure and Idaho case law, plaintiffs expert witnesses are precluded from
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providing opinions, facts, or information at trial which have not been previously
disclosed and provided in plaintiffs written disclosures. To the extent plaintiff elicits
"new", or previously undisclosed, opinions from her expert witnesses during trial
testimony, such testimony is inadmissible and should be excluded. See Radmer v. Ford
Motor Company, 120 Idaho 86, 813 P.2d 897 (1991); Clark v. Raty, 137 Idaho 343, 48

P.3d 672 (2002).
Therefore, the Court should exclude any trial testimony provided by plaintiffs
expert witnesses which has not been previously disclosed and provided in plaintiffs
written expert disclosures.
B.

Plaintiff, Her Counsel, and Her Expert Witnesses Cannot Mention or
Refer to Letters Authored by Dr. Gross or Make Reference to Ms.
Nightengale Bell's Care Being Referred to Risk Management.

This Court has previously ruled that the two letters authored by Dr. Dominic
Gross on October 2, 2007 fall under the peer review privilege, pursuant to Idaho Code §
39-1392 et seq., and entered an order sealing the subject letters. See Memorandum
Decision on Plaintiff's Motion RE: Deposition Questions of Dr. Gross and the Status of
Letters Authored by Dr. Gross, January 15, 2009, p. 6.

This Court's Memorandum Decision, dated January 15,2009, correctly analyzed
the issues presented regarding the status of Dr. Gross' October 2, 2007 letters,
correctly applied the peer review privilege, and correctly sealed the letters. As the Court
succinctly stated, the applicable statutes "provide a broad privilege for peer review
records." See Memorandum Decision on Plaintiffs Motion RE: Deposition Questions of
Dr. Gross and the Status of Letters Authored by Dr. Gross, January 15, 2009, p. 4. This

Court held:
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''These letters constitute reports or memoranda that relate to peer review
and are part of the peer review process. In fact, they are the very type of
document needed to initiate the peer review process. This type of
communication is precisely what the peer review privilege contemplates
for the medical community. As an activity directly related to medical
'quality assurance and improvement,' the authoring and mailing of the
letters constitute a peer review activity. See section 39-1392(a)(11 )(b). In
addition, the letters themselves fall squarely within the broad definition of
peer review records as they constitute 'physical materials relating to peer
review of any health care organization.' See section 39-1392(a)(12)."
See Memorandum Decision on Plaintiff's Motion RE: Deposition Questions of Dr. Gross
and the Status of Letters Authored by Dr. Gross, January 15, 2009, p. 4-5.

This Court also noted the public policy and purpose supporting the protection of
the letters by applying the peer review privilege. "If not privileged, the type of
communication expressed in the letters would be 'inhibited and discouraged,' and the
exchange of information that improves the standards and quality of medical practice in
the State would be compromised." See Memorandum Decision on Plaintiff's Motion RE:
Deposition Questions of Dr. Gross and the Status of Letters Authored by Dr. Gross,

January 15, 2009, p. 5. Thus, this Court properly applied the peer review privilege and
sealed the subject letters.
Plaintiff requests the Court to reconsider its decision concerning the subject
letters, and specifically the letter written by Dr. Gross to Dr. Foss, and argues that the
statutory peer review privilege does not apply. For the reasons this Court already
articulated in its Memorandum Decision, dated January 15, 2009, the plaintiff is wrong.
The peer review privilege must be applied broadly. as mandated by Idaho statute. to
both of Dr. Gross' letters. The Court's analysis and decision ordering the subject letters
sealed is proper.
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Moreover, plaintiff argues she should be able to use the letter from Dr. Gross to
Dr. Foss for impeachment purposes. The Court should deny this request because the
letters are privileged and properly sealed by order of this Court. Thus, the subject letters
are not permitted to be used for any purpose during the trial.
Therefore, plaintiff, her counsel, and her witnesses are precluded from
identifying, mentioning and/or referencing said letters for any purpose at trial.
Additionally, any mention or reference to the care of plaintiff being referred to or sent to
risk management, whether the reference is in testimony or in the medical records
themselves, should be precluded.
Accordingly, Dr. Timmel respectfully requests the Court to preclude plaintiff from
referencing, commenting, or mentioning the letters authored by Dr. Gross or referencing
plaintiffs care being referred to risk management.
C.

Plaintiff Should Be Precluded from Eliciting Testimony and Opinions
from Treating PhYSicians Regarding Standard of Care.

In order to prove her case against Dr. Timmel, plaintiff must satisfy the
requirements of Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013, and prove Dr. Timmel violated the
applicable standard of health care practice in his treatment of plaintiff. Idaho Code
Section 6-1012 requires the plaintiff to prove by direct expert testimony, in its case-inchief, that the defendant health care provider failed to meet the applicable standard of
health care practice in the community in which the care was, or should have been,
provided. I.C.§ 6-1012. See also Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho at 35, 156 P.3d at 536;
Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho at 876,136 P.3d at 347; Dulaney V, Sf. Alphonsus Reg'!
Med. Gtr., 137 Idaho 160, 164, 45 P.3d 816, 820 (2002); Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125

Idaho 208, 868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1994). The expert witness must testify that the
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defendant health care provider did not meet the applicable standard of care to his or her
specific field of health care and specialty. I.C. § 6-1012. Therefore, every defendant
health care provider shall be judged in comparison with similarly trained and qualified
health care providers in the same community, taking into account his or her experience,
training, and field of medical specialization. I.C. § 6-1012. See Ramos v. Dixon, 144
Idaho at 35, 156 P.3d at 536; Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho at 876, 136 P.3d at 347;
Dulaney v. St. Afphonsus Reg'f Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 164,45 P.3d 816, 820 (2002); KoHn
v. St. Luke's Reg. Med. Ctr., 940 P.2d at 1150.

Idaho Code Section 6-1012 must be read in conjunction with Idaho Code Section
6-1013, which provides the foundational requirements for expert testimony in medical
malpractice cases. The plaintiff must establish by one or more knowledgeable,
competent expert witness the applicable standard of practice and the failure to
adequately meet the community standard of care. I.C. § 6-1013. In addition, the plaintiff
must lay a proper foundation for the expert testimony before the court will admit the
expert testimony into evidence. I.C. § 6-1013. See a/so Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health
Services, 143 Idaho 834,153 P.3d 1180, 1183 (2007); Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho 32,

156 P.3d 533,536 (2007); Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho at 164,
45 P.3d at 533; Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902, 905, 935 P.2d 165, 168 (1997);
Watts v. Lynn, 125 Idaho 341, 345, 870 P.2d 1300,1304 (1994); Rhodehouse v. Stutts,

868 P.2d at 1227-28.
Idaho Code Section 6-1013 provides the requirements that the plaintiff must
establish for laying a proper foundation for expert testimony, which are: (1) the opinion
is actually held by the expert witness, (2) the opinion is held with a reasonable degree of
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medical certainty, and (3) the expert possesses actual knowledge of the applicable
community standard which was in place at the time of the alleged malpractice. I.C. § 61013. Thus, the plaintiff's expert's testimony must show that he or she familiarized
himself or herself with the local standard of care for a particular defendant, whether the
defendant be an emergency physician, orthopedic surgeon, nurse, hospital, or other
health care worker. I.C. § 6-1013. See also Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho 32, 156 P.2d at
536 (2007). As a foundation for expert testimony, a plaintiff must establish that his or
her expert witness has actual knowledge of the local standard of care and skill ordinarily
exercised by a similar provider in the same community. I.C. § 6-1013.
If an expert witness is not from the locality where the alleged malpractice
occurred, the expert can only demonstrate an adequate familiarity with the local
standard of care by consulting with a health care provider who practices in the same
community where the alleged malpractice occurred. Kolin

v. St. Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr.,

130 Idaho 323, 940 P.2d 1142, 1147-48 (1997); Watts v. Lynn, 870 P.2d at 1304;
Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 868 P.2d 1224, 1228 (1994) (In order to show

actual knowledge of the local standard of care under I.C. § 6-1013, the Court has held
that a medical expert from out of the area must inquire of a local specialist as to the
local community standard of care.); Strode v. Lenzi, 116 Idaho 214, 775 P.2d at 108
(holding that before a board certified specialist from outside the state may testify as to
the local standard of care, the specialist "must, at a minimum, inquire of a local
specialist to determine whether the local community standard varies from the national
standard for that board certified specialty.").
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The term "community" refers to that geographical area ordinarily served by the
licensed general hospital at or nearest to which such care was provided. I.C. § 6-1012.
In addition, if plaintiff's standard of care experts do not have actual knowledge of the
applicable standard of care, then plaintiff's expert witnesses must show that they have
adequately familiarized themselves with that standard of care in order to testify at trial.
Thus, plaintiff must elicit expert testimony to prove her case against Dr. Timme!.
In the present, the Court established deadlines for the disclosure of expert witnesses
and the manner in which the parties' disclosures must be made in this Court's
Scheduling Order, dated January 8, 2009. The Court's Order stated: U[t]reating
physicians for the purposes of this scheduling order are deemed to be an expert
witness." See Scheduling Order, January 8, 2009, p. 3,,-r 7.
Moreover, the Court ordered U[a]/I parties' disclosure as to experts shall be in

compliance with Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i)." See Scheduling Order, January 8,2009, p. 3,

1f 7.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(A)(i) provides the requirements for the discovery
disclosures required for expert witnesses, including treating physicians which the Court
deems to be expert witnesses, and states each party must disclose the following:
UA complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis
and reasons therefore; the data or other information considered by
the witness in forming the opinions; any exhibits to be used as a
summary of or support for the opinions; any qualifications of the
witness, including a list of all publications authored by the witness
within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the
testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the witness has
testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four
years."
J.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i) (emphasis added).
To date, plaintiff has submitted an original and six supplemental disclosures.
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However, none of these disclosure documents provide a complete statement of all
opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons for such opinions for any of the
treating physicians, including but not limited to, Dr. Gross, Dr. Gilbertson, Dr. Yeakley,
Dr. Timmel, and/or Dr. Quinn. Plaintiffs expert disclosures are also deficient because
plaintiff fails to provide the data or other information considered by the disclosed
treating physicians (again, including but not limited to, Dr. Gross, Dr. Gilbertson, Dr.
Yeakley, Dr. Timmel, and/or Dr. Quinn) in forming such opinions. Plaintiff also does not
disclose any exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for said opinions of

the plaintiffs disclosed list of treating physicians.
In contrast, plaintiff merely provides a list of a/l experts, including treating
physicians the Court deems as expert witnesses, in its Sixth Supplemental Expert
Disclosure and neglects to provide a complete statement of each expert's opinion, the
basis for said opinion, and exhibits to be used in support of each expert's opinion.
Rather, plaintiff's disclosure only provides U[b]ecause these treating physicians are
'deemed' experts by this Court, it is expected that they will render opinions relating to
the medical care and treatment they provided to Plaintiff specifically, issues of
proximate cause, and/or the standard of health care generally in Boise, Idaho in the
summer of 2007." See Plaintiff's Sixth Supplemental Expert Disclosure, p. 2.
However, as already noted, plaintiff fails to comply with Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(4 )(A){i) because plaintiff does not provide a complete statement of
each treating physician's opinion, the basis for said opinion, and exhibits to be used in
support of each expert's opinion. Since plaintiff failed to provide Dr. Timmel the required
information for expert disclosures, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
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26(b)(4)(A)(i) and the Court's January 8, 2009 Scheduling Order, the Court should
preclude plaintiff from calling as expert witnesses, or seeking opinions as to causation
and standard of care, plaintiff's treating health care providers. This would include, but
not be limited to, Dr. Gross, Dr. Gilbertson, and Dr. Yeakley.
Furthermore, due to plaintiff's failure to comply with the expert disclosure
requirements of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(A){i) regarding disclosure of the
respective treating physicians' opinions, plaintiff cannot utilize or rely upon the testimony
of these experts to satisfy the requirements of Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013
regarding the applicable standard of care. See Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 45 P.3d
810 (2002) (Idaho Supreme Court excluded trial testimony of expert witness regarding
standard of care which was not properly disclosed. pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, in discovery prior to trial).
Therefore. the Court should preclude plaintiff from eliciting testimony and
opinions from the treating physicians regarding the applicable standard of health care
practice as it pertains to Dr. Timme!.
CONCLUSION

Based upon the preceding argument, Dr. Timmel respectfully requests the Court
to grant his Motions in Limine in their entirety.
DATED this Z~(~ay of September, 2009.
TOLMAN & BRIZEE. P.C.

:zs-~ 4 ~

By:
Steven . Tolman
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Chris D. Comstock
ISB #6581; cdc@haUfarley.com
HALL, FARLEY, OBERREClIT & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
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Telephone: (208) 395-8500
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Attomeys for Defendant Jason Quinn, M.D. and Idaho Emergency Physicians, P.A.,

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

JANET BELL NIGHTENGALE,
Case No. CV OC 0722814

Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT JASON QUINN, M.D.'S
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTIONS IN LIMINE

VS.

JASON QUINN, M.D.; IDAlIO
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS) P.A.; A...'lD
KEVIN MATTHEW TIMMEL, M.D.,
Defendants.

COME NOW, defendants Jason Quilm, M.D., and Idaho Emergency Physicians, P.A.
(collectively "Dr. Quinn") by and through their counsel of record, Hall, Farley, Oberrecht &
Blanton, P.A., and submit this Reply Memorandum in Support of Motions in Limine.

I. ARGUMENT
First, plaintiff did not object to Dr. Quinn's Motion in Limine as it related to item 3,
precluding plaintiff or Dennis Nightengale from offering any testimony as to their alleged
conversations with Dr. Dominic Gross or other medical providers as to criticisms of care
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provided by Dr. Quinn or Dr. Timmel or as to causation. As such, Dr. Quinn requests the Court
grant his Motion in Limine as to this issue.

A.

DR. QUINN SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO ELICIT TESTIMONY FROM DR.
DRAPER THAT HIS CARE AND TREATMENT OF PLAINTIFF MET THE
STANDARD OF CARE.
Dr. Quinn's position on most of the issues raised by plaintiff regarding Dr. Draper in her

Response to Dr. Quinn's Motions in Limine have previously been addressed in Dr. Quinn's
earlier briefmg in support of his Motions in Limine. As a result, Dr. Quirm refers the Court to
such discussion, and he will not reiterate all of his earlier arguments here.
Contrary to Plaintiffs contention, the Court did not authorize her to "substitute" new
expert disclosures for those previously made; rather, the Court required her to supplement her
disclosures (i.e., provide additional infom1ation) to comply v/ith the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Court's Scheduling Order.
All of the testimonial topics sought by Dr. Quinn from Dr. Draper were previously
disclosed through Plaintiffs disclosure of Dr. Draper's expert reports. He was never maintained
as a consulting expert, but instead specifically disclosed as a retained expert testifying as to

standard of care and causation issues, including opinions regarding Dr. Quinn. The idea that
Plaintiff could now unilaterally limit the scope of Dr. Draper's examination, who has opinions
that are not only favorable to Dr. Quinn, but are also inconsistent with the opinions of Plaintiffs
other expert, is unreasonable and would be unfairly prejudicial to Dr. Quinn. Plaintiff must be
prepared to accept the negative comments, along with the positive statements) of her selected
experts.
In addition, Dr. Quinn has appropriately identified and disclosed Dr. Draper's opinions,

and he should be permiUed to elicit such testimony. There will be no surprise and Dr. Quinn has
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fully complied with the applicable rules and requirements for identification of Dr. Draper's
testimony.
Dr. Draper's testimony also directly contradicts that of Plaintiffs other retained and
disclosed expert, Dr. Lally, who is expected to offer opinions critical of Dr. Quinn. Such
contradiction makes Dr. Draper's testimony further relevant to the credibility of Dr. Lally and
should be allowed for that reason as well. While Dr. Quilm does not believe that "exceptional
circumstances" are required under the facts of this case, the complete divergence of opinion of

Dr. Draper and Dr. Lally (physicians who practice together at the same facility) certainly
provides exceptional circumstances under which Dr. Quinn should be pemlitted to explore the
contradiction between such witnesses
For the reasons stated herein, and those detailed in Dr. Quinn's previous filings, Dr.
Quinn should be pemlittcd to call Dr. Draper as a witness and/or exceed the scope of direct in
order to elicit testimony on any of the topics detailed in his reports (incorporated into Plaintiffs
original Expert Disclosure) and his deposition.
B.

PLAINTIFF'S CANNOT USE ANY DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT FOR ANY
PURPOSE
Dr. Quinn's motion in limine as to requesting notice of plaintiff's intent to use portions of

deposition transcripts in her opening is not overly broad or l.mfairly prejudicial. Plaintiff relies
on Idallo Rule of Civil Procedure 32(a) for the proposition that "deposition testimony can be
used for any purpose, including opening statements, under Idaho Rules." However) as the Court
is aware, there are limitations for the use of deposition testimony as further set forth in IRCP
32(a). Specifically, Wlless it is deposition testimony of a party, plaintiff must establish certain
requirements prior to reading or displaying deposition testimony in an opening statement.
Specifically, IRCP 32(a)(3) provides that a deposition may be used for any purpose "if the court
finds: (A) that the witness is dead; or (B) that the witness is at a greater distance than 100 miles
DEfENDANT JASON QUINN, M.D. 'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS IN LIMINE _
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from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the state of Idaho ... or (C) that the ~itness is
unable to attend or testify because of age, illness, infonnation or imprisonment; or (D) that the
party otTering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the Vvitness by

subpoena; or (E) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to
make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting

the testimony of witnesses orally in open court .... "
Dr. Quinn concedes that seven days notice may not be practical for the parties under the
circumstances; however, providing notice to opposing counsel of an intent to use any portions of
depositions in opening statements should be manageable if it was required to be given by the
close of business on the Friday before trial commences (5:00 p.m. on October 3, 2009).

C.

COMMENTS IN DR. GROSS'S RECORDS REGARDING RISK
MANAGEMENT SHOULD BE REDACTED AS THEY ARE IMPROPER
EXPERT TESTIMONY, IRRELEVANT AND UNDULY PREJUDICIAL
Plaintiff objects to any redaction of Dr. Gross's records arguing they are admissible as

created, and that there is no legitimate basis to redact the statements about "Risk Management."
PlaintitT argues "[t]he fact that Dr. Gross is now unwilling to testify with respect to his initial
reactions is immaterial."
Dr. Gross's History and Physical of plaintiff on July 20,2007 includes the sentence "Risk
Management V\-ill have to see tlus patient based upon several visits to the emergency room where
this was undiagnosed until the hand was dead."

The preceding statement implies that Dr.

Quinn's and Dr. Timmcl' s care and treatment of plaintiff was inappropriate.
Dr. Gross clearly and unequivocally stated in his deposition that he is not qualified to
offer any standard of care opinions as to either Dr. Quinn's or Dr. Timmel's care of plaintiff, as
he himself is not an emergency medicine physician. See Affidavit of Counsel in Support of
Motions in Limine Aff., Ex. G (portions of Dr. Gross's deposition transcript), pp. 72-73, 11. 22-
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19) Plaintiff has the burden of establishing the s1andard of care applicable to Drs. Quinn and
Timme], and any breach thereof, through qualified expert testimony. Dr. Gross, by his own
admission, is not qualit1ed to offer standard of care opinions against Drs. Quinn and Timme!.
Theretore, even assuming Dr. Gross's comment in his medical record was an opinion he actually

held, it is still an improper expert opinion, as Dr. Gross is not qualified to offer such opinion, and
the statement should be redacted.
Further, plaintiff is unable to overcome the hurdle that the statement is inadmissible
hearsay. Specifically, although the statement is contained in a medical record, it was not made
or offered by Dr. Gross for purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis, and therefore does not
fall under any hearsay exception.

PlaintitT argues there is no unfair prejudice if the record is 110t redacted. Drs. Quinn and
TimmeI would be unfairly prejudiced if such statement was not redac1ed from the record, as it
would in effect provide the jury with an inadmissible and unqualified expert opinion (in v\lIiting)
that could easily be improperly interpreted by the jury as a critical opinion regarding the care
rendered by the defendants.
As such, Dr. Quinn respectfully requests the Court redact the above quoted statement

from Dr. Gross' History and Physical of pl.aintiff dated July 20, 2007.

D.

PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE ALLO\VED TO ELICIT EXPERT OPINION
TESTMONY FROM TREATING PHYSICIANS REGARDING STANDARD
OF CARE OPINIONS
Plaintiff failed to disclose any opinions (or the reasons and basis thereof) of physicians

who treated her in the period of time relevant to this action in her cxpen disclosures. However,
on the eve of trial; plaintiff disclosed a number of treating physicians as experts and now "seeks
the ability 10 question these witnesses within their disclosed areas of expertise." The Court's
Scheduling order indicates thaI treating phYSicians are deemed experts. As such, in order to
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elicit expert testimony from such providers, plaintiff needed to provide actual disclosures for
these witnesses, which she has failed to do.
Plaintiff states she "docs not expect any of the treating physicians to opine as to whether
the standard of care was met with respect to any defendant in this case," however, she indicates
she will seek opinions from these treaters within their expertise. Plaintiff saw numerous other
emergency medicine physicians during the June and July 2007 time frame. As such, standard of
care for emergency medicine physicians practicing in Boise, Idaho in July 2007 may be within
their expertise.
Again; plaintiff failed to identify any of these experts as standard of care or causation
experts and has failed to provide any idea of what opinions these treaters actually hold. As such,
plaintiff should not be allowed to attempt to elicit expert standard of care or causation testimony
frOUl these treaters at trial. Plaintiff argues the treating physicians were not retained experts and
therefore she "had no ability until depositions to fully elicit opinions that are held." First, a
number of the named treating physicians have not been deposed. Second, plaintiff had and has
access 10 these treaters that defendants do not. To the extent plaintiff desired to seek expert
opinion testimony from such witness, she could have sought and indel1tified any such opinions in
compliance with the court's scheduling order. On the other hand, defendants arc not permitted to
unilaterally contact plaintiffs treating physicians and without notice from plaintiff, had no
reason to believe expert opinion testimony would be provided by such individuals, which would
have likely necessitated deposing anyone identified by plaintiff expected to testifY.
Allowing plaintiff to elicit standard of care or causation opinion testimony from any of
plaintiffs treating physicians would clearly be prejudicial to Dr. Quinn or Dr. Timme1, as it
would in effect provide plruntiffwith additional experts. Further, any testimony as to standard of
care or causation would also be cumulative testimony that would waste the Court and the jury's
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time. Plaintiff has identified Dr. Draper and Dr. Lally as experts in this case as to both standard
of care and causation. Finally, allowing plaintiff to elicit such testimony would allow plaintiff to
"ambush" the defendants with undisclosed expert opinions that the defendants could neither plan
tor or investigate through the discovery process or otherwise. Clearly, such result would be

unfair and prejudicial, and it would run contrary to the intent of the rules and the scheduling
order issued by the court.

n. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated previously in Dr. Quinn's Memorandum in Support of Motions in
Limjne as well as those set forth above, Dr. Quinn requests the Court grant his Motions in
Limine.

DA TED this

21-

day of September, 2009.

HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT
& BLANTON, P.A.

c

an - Of the Firm
r Defendant Jason Quinn, M.D.
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the following:
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It._
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Hand Delivered
Ovemi ght Mail
Telecopy

K

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
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Dinius Law
5680 E. Franklin Road, Suite 130
Nampa,ID 83687-7901
Facsimile (208) 475-0101
kdinius@diniuslaw.com
Auorney for Plaintiff

u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid

Sleven K. Tolman
Tolman. Brizee & Martens PC

POBox 1276
Twin Falls, ID 83303
Attorneysfor Defendant Kevin Timme/, MD
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
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JANET BELL NIGHTENGALE,
Case No. CV OC 0722814
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PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
AND SPECIAL VERDICT
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JASON QUINN, M.D.; IDAHO
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, P.A.; AND
KEVIN MATTHEW TIMMEL, M.D.,
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INSTRUCTION NO.1
These instructions explain your duties as jurors and define the law that applies to this
case. It is your duty to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these instructions to those
facts, and in this way to decide the case. Your decision should be based upon a rational and
objective assessment of the evidence. It should not be based on sympathy or prejudice.
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case, and it is

your duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions as a whole, not
picking out one and disregarding others. The order in which these instructions are given or the
manner in which they are numbered has no significance as to the importance of any of them. If
you do not understand an instruction, you may send a note to me through the bailiff, and I will try
to clarifY or explain the point further.
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. This
evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and any
stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of the attorneys may help you
understand the evidence and apply the instructions, what they say is not evidence.

If an

attorney's argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, you should disregard it.
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times during the trial,
I sustained an objection to a question without permitting the witness to answer it, or to an offered
exhibit without receiving it into evidence.

My rulings are legal matters, and are solely my

responsibility. You must not speculate as to the reason for any objection, which was made, or my
ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision you may not consider such a question or exhibit or

000491

speculate as to what the answer or exhibit would have shown. Remember, a question is not
evidence and should be considered only as it gives meaning to the answer.
There were occasions where an objection was made after an answer was given or the
remark was made, and in my ruling on the objection I instructed that the answer or remark be
stricken, or directed that you disregard the answer or remark and dismiss it from your minds. In
your deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark, but must treat it as though you
had never heard it.
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course of the
trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what
weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this courtroom all of the experience
and background of your lives. There is no magical formula for evaluating testimony. In your
everyday affairs, you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and how
much weight you attach to what you are told. The considerations you use in making the more
important decisions in your everyday dealings are the same considerations you should apply in
your deliberations in this case.

IDJI2d 1.00

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO.2
There are certain things you must not do during this trial:
1.

You must not associate in any way with the parties, any of the attorneys or their

employees, or any of the witnesses.
2

You must not discuss the case with anyone, or permit anyone to discuss the case

with you. If anyone attempts to discuss the case with you, or to influence your decision in the
case, you must report it to me promptly.
3.

You must not discuss the case with other jurors until you retire to the jury room to

deliberate at the close of the entire case.
4.

You must not make up your mind until you have heard all of the testimony and

have received my instructions as to the law that applies to the case.
5.

You must not contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gam a greater

understanding of the case.

IDJI2d 1.03 (Modified by deleting number 6;
specifically, if any juror requires medical
attention, he or she should not be prohibited from
seeking medical care or treatment at Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center or S1. Luke's
Regional Medical Center)

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER

000493

INSTRUCTION NO.3
During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions
concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into evidence
and any notes taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings.
If you take notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is not thereby diverted
from the witness or his testimony; and you must keep your notes to yourself and not show them
to other persons or jurors until the jury deliberations at the end of the trial.

IDJI2d 1.01

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO.4
In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or decide any
question by chance, such as by the Hip of a coin or drawing of straws. If money damages are to
be awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may not agree in advance to average
the sum of each individual juror's estimate as the method of determining the amount of the
damage award or percentage of negligence.

IDJI2d l.09

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO.5
Whether a party has insurance is not relevant to any of the questions you are to decide.
You must avoid any inference, speculation or discussion about insurance.

IDJI2d 1.04
Lemkuhl v. Bolland, 114 Idaho 503, 757 P.2d
1222 (et. App. 1998)

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO.6
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is evidence that directly
proves a fact. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves the fact, by proving one
or more facts irom which the fact at issue may be inferred.
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as to the degree
of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is respected for such
convincing force as it may carry.

IDJI2d 1.24.2

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO.7
Any statement by me identifYing a claim of a party is not evidence in this case. I have
advised you of the claims of the parties merely to acquaint you with the issues to be decided.

IDJI2d 1.05

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO.8
On July 11, 2007, plaintiff Janet Nightengale was seen at Saint Alphonsus
Regional Medical Center's Emergency Department for neck, left shoulder and left arm
pain. Defendant Jason Quinn, M.D. treated Mrs. Nightengale at Saint Alphonsus
Regional Medical Center's Emergency Department on July 11,2007. Dr. Quinn
discharged Mrs. Nightengale with instructions to follow up with the Terry Reilly Clinic
within four days.
On July 16, 2007, Mrs. Nightengale sought treatment at St. Luke's Regional
Medical Center's Emergency Department. Defendant Jason Timmel, M.D., treated Mrs.
Nightengale at S1. Luke's Regional Medical Center's Emergency Department on July
16, 2007. Dr. Timmel discharged Mrs. Nightengale with instructions to follow up with a
orthopedic physician within the week.
On July 20, 2007, Mrs. Nightengale sought treatment at the Terry Reilly Clinic.
Mrs. Nightengale was then sent to St.Luke's Emergency Department and ultimately
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, where a left above elbow amputation was
performed. Mrs. Nightengale alleges her amputation was the result of negligent care
and treatment provided to her by defendants Dr. Quinn and Dr. Timmel.
IDJI2d 1.07 (Modified)

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED _________
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO.9
Certain evidence was presented to you by deposition. A deposition is testimony taken
under oath before the trial and preserved in writing and/or by video recording. This evidence is
entitled to the same consideration you would have given had the witness testified from the
witness stand.
You will only receive this testimony in open court. Although there is a record of the
testimony taken by deposition, this record will not be available to you during your deliberations.

IDJI2d 1.22 (Modified to past tense and to add
preservation by video recording)

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO.1 0
In this case, certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. I called your attention
to this when the evidence was admitted. I remind you that whenever evidence was admitted for a
limited purpose, you must not consider such evidence for any purpose other than the limited
purpose for which it was admitted.

IDJI2d 1.28

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO. 11
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the expression "if
you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably
true than not true.

IDJI2d 1.20.1

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO. 12
On the claim of medical negligence against Jason Quinn, M.D. alleging failure to meet
the standard of care, the plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
1.

That Dr. Quinn failed to meet the applicable standard of care as defined in these

instructions;
2.

That the plaintiff was injured;

3.

That the acts of the Dr. Quinn which failed to meet the applicable standard of care

"vere a proximate cause of the inj uries of the plaintiff; and
4.

The elements of damage and the amount thereof.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has
been proved, your verdict should be for the plaintiff; however, if you find that anyone or more of
these propositions has not been proved, then the plaintiff has not met the burden of proof
required and your verdict should be for Dr. Quinn.

IDJI2d 2.10 (Modified)
IDJI 270 (Modified)
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INSTRUCTION NO. 13
On the claim of medical negligence against Kevin Timmel, M.D. alleging failure to meet
the standard of care, the plaintiffs have the burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
1.

That Dr. Timmel failed to meet the applicable standard of care as defined in these

instructions;
2.

That the plaintitf was injured;

3.

That the acts of Dr. Timmel which failed to meet the applicable standard of care

were a proximate cause of the injuries of the plaintiff; and
4.

The elements of damage and the amount thereof.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has
been proven, your verdict should be for the plaintiff; however, if you find that anyone or more of
these propositions has not been proven, then the plaintiff has not met the burden of proof
required and your verdict should be for Dr. Timme!.
IDJI2d 2.10.3 (Modified)
IDJI 270 (Modified)
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INSTRUCTION NO. 14
In detennining whether Dr. Quinn's and Dr. Timmel's conduct satisfied the applicable
standard of practice as it has been stated to you, you are not permitted to set up arbitrarily a
standard of your o\vn. You must detennine the applicable standard of practice required of Dr.
Quinn and Dr. Timmel and any breach thereof only from the testimony of those persons,
including Dr. Quinn and Dr. Timmel, who have testified as expert witnesses as to such standard
in this case.
BAlI 214-B (modified)
Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013
Watts v. Lynn, 125 Idaho 341, 870
P.2d 1300 (1994)
Frank v. East Shoshone Hosp., 114
Idaho 480, 757 P.2d 1199 (1988)
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INSTRUCTION NO. 15
To prove that Dr. Quinn was "negligent," the plaintiff must prove, by direct expert
testimony and by a preponderance of all of the competent evidence, that Dr. Quinn failed to meet
the standard of health care practice in Boise, Idaho, as such standard existed on July 11, 2007,
with respect to the class of health care provider to which Dr. Quinn belonged and in which he
was functioning; here, a board certified emergency medicine physician.
Doctors such as Dr. Quinn shall be judged in comparison with similarly trained and
qualified doctors in the same community taking into account his training, experience and field of
specialization.
Idaho Code § 6-1012
Hilden v. Ball, 117 Idaho 314,787 P.2d 1122
(1989)
IDJI 2.10.1 (In concept)
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INSTRUCTION NO. 16
To prove that Dr. Timmel was "negligent," the plaintiff must prove, by direct expert
testimony and by a preponderance of all of the competent evidence, that Dr. Timmel failed to
meet the standard of health care practice in Boise, Idaho, as such standard existed on July 16,
2007, with respect to the class of health care provider to which Dr. Timmel belonged and in
which he was functioning; here, a board certified emergency medicine physician.
Doctors such as Dr. Timmel shall be judged in comparison with similarly trained and
qualified doctors in the same community taking into account his training, experience and field of
specialization.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 17
When I use the word "negligence" in these instructions, I mean the failure to use ordinary
care in the management of one's property or person. The words "ordinary care" mean the care a
reasonably careful person would use under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence.
Negligence may thus consist of the failure to do something which a reasonably careful person
would do, or the doing of something a reasonably careful person would not do, under
circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence.
IDJI2d 2.20
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INSTRUCTION NO. 18
In detennining whether medical providers such as Dr. Quinn or Dr. Timmel have failed to
meet the appropriate standards of health care required of each of them in treating a patient, their
judgment must be considered in light of all the facts and circumstances with which each was
confronted at the time. Medical providers such as Dr. Quinn and Dr. Timmel are not to be
judged by after-acquired knowledge or by the results of their treatment; the test is not what
hindsight may reveal should have been done in light of subsequently occurring conditions.
Bloom v. Bonner General Hospital, Inc., D.C.
Idaho, 82-3081 (1985)
Keaton v. Greenville Hospital System, 514 S.E.
2d 570, 574-75 (1999)
Boudoin v. Crawford and Marshall, Ltd., 709 S.2d
798, 808 (5th Cir. 1998)
Klisch v. Meritcare Medical Group, Inc., 134 F.3d
1356, 1359-60 (8th Cir. 1998)
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INSTRUCTION NO. 19
A plaintiff in a medical negligence action is required to prove a breach of the community
standard of care.

The mere fact that an undesirable or unfortunate result occurs following

medical care rendered by a defendant does not, by itself, establish a breach of the standard of care
by the defendant.
Idaho Code § 6-1013
Pearson v. Parsons, 114 Idaho 334, 757 P.2d 197
(1988)
Swallow v. Emergency Medicine of Idaho, 138
Idaho 589, 67 P.3d. 68 (2005)
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INSTRUCTION NO. 20
You have heard from the expert witnesses who have testified in this case with differing
vIews as to what would be the appropriate standards to be followed by a board certified
emergency medicine physician providing medical care under the circumstances presented here. If
you find from these opinions that two or more alternative courses of action would be recognized
by the profession as proper and that Dr. Quinn chose one of those courses of action, then a
verdict should be returned in favor of Dr. Quinn.
Jones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d 964, 969 (I 992)
Fragale v. Brigham, 741 A.2d 788, 791 (1999)
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INSTRUCTION NO. 21
You have heard from the expert witnesses who have testified in this case with differing
VIews as to what would be the appropriate standards to be followed by a board certified
emergency medicine physician providing medical care under the circumstances presented here. If
you find from these opinions that two or more alternative courses of action would be recognized
by the profession as proper and that Dr. Timmel chose one of those courses of action, then a
verdict should be returned in favor of Dr. Timmel.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 22
If plaintiffs prove that Dr. Quinn failed to meet the applicable standard of care, plaintiff
has the additional burden of proving through expert testimony that his failure to meet the
applicable standard of care was, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the proximate cause
of plaintitT's injuries.
IDJI 271 (In part and modified)
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INSTRUCTION NO. 23

If plaintiffs prove that Dr. Timmel failed to meet the applicable standard of care, plaintiff
has the additional burden of proving through expert testimony that his failure to meet the
applicable standard of care was, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the proximate cause
of plaintiff s injuries.
IDJI 271 (In part and modified)
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INSTRUCTION NO. 24
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause which, in natural or
probable sequence, produced the complained injury, loss or damage, and but for that cause the
damage would not have occurred.

It need not be the only cause.

It is sufficient if it is a

substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a proximate cause if the
injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway.
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent conduct of
two or more persons or entities contribute concurrently as substantial factors in bringing about an
injury, the conduct of each may be a proximate cause of the injury regardless of the extent to
which each contributes to the injury.

IDJI2d 2.30.1.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 25
In this case, the defendants have alleged that the plaintiff was negligent. On this defense,
the defendants have the burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
1.

That the plaintiff was negligent.

2.

That the negligence of the plaintiff was a proximate cause of her
own ll1Junes.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has
been proven, you should answer Questions No.6 and No.7 on the verdict form "YES." If you
find from your consideration of all the evidence that proposition No. 1 has not been proven, you
should Answer Question No.6 "NO." If you find from your consideration of all the evidence
that proposition No. 1 was proven but proposition No. 2 was not proven, you should answer
Question No.6 "YES" and Question No.7 "NO."
IDJI2d 1.41.4.2.(modified)
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INSTRUCTION NO. 26
In this case, the defendants have alleged that some other individual or entity, not a party
to this lawsuit, was negligent. On this defense, the defendants have the burden of proof on each
of the following propositions:
1.

Another individual or entity was negligent.

2.

The negligence of the other individual or entity was a proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injuries.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has
been proven, you should answer Questions No.8 and No.9 on the verdict form "YES." If you
tind from your consideration of all the evidence that proposition No.1 has not been proven, you
should Answer Question No.8 "NO." If you find from your consideration of all the evidence
that proposition 1 was proven but proposition No.2 was not proven, you should answ'er Question
No.8 "YES" and Question No.9 "NO."
IDJI2d 1.41.4.3.(modified)
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INSTRUCTION NO. 27
By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion as to
whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages.

IDJI2d 9.00
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INSTRUCTION NO. 28
If the jury decides the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendants, the jury must
determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate the plaintitI for any
damages proved to be proximately caused by the defendants' negligence.
The elements of damage the jury may consider are:
A.

B.

Non-economic damages
1.

The nature of the injuries;

2.

The physical and mental pain and suffering, past and future;

3.

The impairment of abilities to perform usual activities;

4.

The disfigurement caused by the injuries;

5.

The aggravation caused to any preexisting condition.

Economic damages
1.

The reasonable value of necessary medical care received
and expenses incurred as a result of the injury and the
present cash value of medical care and expenses reasonably
certain and necessary to be required in the future;

2.

The reasonable value of necessary services provided by
another in doing things for the plaintiff: which, except for
the injury, the plaintiff would ordinarily have performed
and the present cash value of such services reasonably
certain to be required in the future;

Whether the plaintiff has proved any of these elements is for the jury to decide.
IDJI2d 9.01.(modified)
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INSTRUCTION NO. 29
You are instructed that if you find plaintiff is entitled to damages, then you must only
award such damages that have been proved by plaintiff with reasonable certainty.
You are not permitted to award speculative damages, which means compensation for
future loss or harm which, although possible, is conjectural or not reasonably certain to occur in
the future.
BAJI 1460 (7th ed. )(Modified)
Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 95 Idaho 752, 519 P.2d
421 (1974)
McLean v. City of Spirit Lake, 91 Idaho 779, 430
P.2d 670 (1967)
McGuire v. Post Falls Lumber & Mfg. Co., 23
Idaho 608,131 P. 654 (1913)
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INSTRUCTION NO. 30
When I use the phrase "present cash value" as to any damage that may accrue in the
future, I mean that sum of money determined and paid now which, when invested at a reasonable
rate of interest, would be sufficient to pay the future damages at the time and in the amount the
future damages will be incurred.

IDJI2d 9.13
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INSTRUCTION NO. 31
Under a standard table of mortality, the life expectancy of a female age _

is _

years.

This figure is not conclusive. It is an actuarial estimate of the average probable remaining length
of life based upon statistical samples of death rates and ages at death in this country. This data
may be considered in connection with all other evidence relating to the probable life expectancy,
including the subject's occupation, health, habits, and other activities.

IDJI2d 9.15.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 32
Your award, if any, for plaintiff's injuries will not be subject to any income taxes, and
you should not consider such taxes in fixing the amount of your award.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 33
A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the damage and
prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to exercise such care cannot be
recovered.

IDJI2d 9.14
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INSTRUCTION NO. 34
A person who has a preexisting condition or disability is entitled to recover damages for
the aggravation of such preexisting condition, if any, that is proximately caused by the
occurrence.

The person is not entitled to recover damages for the preexisting condition or

disability itself.
If you find that before the occurrence causing the injuries in this case that Janet
Nightengale had a preexisting bodily condition or disability, and further find that because of the
new occurrence in this case the preexisting condition or disability was aggravated, then you
should consider the aggravation of the condition or disability in fixing the damages in this case.
You should not consider any condition or disability that existed prior to the occurrence, or any
aggravation of such condition that was not caused or contributed to by reason of this occurrence.
You are to apportion, if possible, between the condition or disability prior to this
occurrence and the condition or disability caused by this occurrence, and assess liability
accordingly. If no apportionment can reasonably be made by you, then the defendants are liable
for the entire damage.

IDJI2d 9.02 (Modified)
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INSTRUCTION NO. 35
If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you may send
a note signed by one or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate with me
by any means other than such a note.
During your deliberations, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on any of
the questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so by me.

IDJI2d 1.11.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 36
Members of the Jury: In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that at least three-fourths
of the jury agree. Your verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror agreeing to
it.

It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual judgment. Each of you
must decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an impartial consideration of the evidence
with your fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your
own views and change your opinion if convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your
honest conviction as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your
fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
You are not partisans. You are judges - judges of the facts. Your sole interest is to
ascertain the truth from the evidence in the case.

IDJI2d 1.13.1.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 37

In this case, you will return a Special Verdict consisting of a series of questions. In
answering a question, you must be persuaded, considering all of the evidence in this case, that
your choice of answer is more probably true than not true. Because the explanation on the form
which you will have is part of my instructions to you, I will read the verdict form to you and
explain it. It states:
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:
Question No.1:

Did defendant Jason Quinn, M.D., negligently fail to meet the

applicable standard of health care practice in his treatment and care of Mrs. Nightengale?
Answer to Question No.1:

Yes L-J

NoL-J

If you answered "No" to Question No.1, then do not answer Question No.2 and proceed
directly to Question No.3.
If you answered "Yes" to Question No.1, then answer Question No.2.
Question No.2: Was Dr. Quinn's negligence a proximate cause of Mrs. Nightengale's
injuries?
Answer to Question No.2:

Yes[~

No L-J

Please answer Question No.3.
Question No.3:

Did defendant Kevin Timmel negligently fail to meet the applicable

standard of health care practice in his treatment and care of Mrs. Nightengale?
Answer to Question No.3:

Yes[~

If your answers to Questions No.

and 3 were "No" you are finished. Please sign the

NoL-J

000528
1

verdict form and tell the bailiff that you are finished. If you answered "Yes" to Question No.3,
then answer Question No.4.
Question No.4: Was Dr. Timmel's negligence a proximate cause of Mrs. Nightengale's
injuries?
Answer to Question No.4:

Yes [.-J

No [.-J

If your answers to Questions No.2 and 4 were "No" you are finished. Please sign the
verdict form and tell the bailiff that you are finished. Otherwise, please answer Question No.5.
Question No.5: Was Janet Nightengale negligent?
Answer to Question No.5:

Yes [.-J

No [.-J

If your answer to Question No. 5 was "No" do not answer Question No. 6 and move
directly to Question No.7. If your answer to Question No.5 was "Yes" please answer Question
No.6.
Question No. 6:Was Janet Nightengale's negligence a proximate cause of her injuries?
Answer to Question No.6:

YesL-.J

No L-.J

Please answer Question No.7.
Question No.7: Was a third party negligent?
If your answer to Question No. 7 was "No" do not answer Question No. 8 and move
directly to Question No.9. If your answer to Question No.7 was "Yes" please answer Question
No.8.
Question No.8:

Was the third party's negligence a proximate cause of Mrs.

Nightengale's injuries?
Instruction for Question No.9: You will reach this question if you have found that

2
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either defendant Dr. Quinn or defendant Dr. Timmel was negligent, which negligence caused
injury to plaintiff In this question, you are to apportion the fault between the negligent parties in
terms of a percentage. As to each party or entity to which you answered "Yes" on Questions
Nos. 2, 4, 6, and 8 determine the percentage of fault for that party or entity, and enter the
percentage on the appropriate line. If you answered "No" to any of the above questions, insert a
"0" or "Zero" as to that party or entity. Your total percentages must equal 100%.
Question No.9:

What is the percentage of fault (if any) you assign to each of the

following:
Answer to Question No.9:
To the Defendant, Jason Quinn, M.D ..

%

To the Defendant, Kevin Timmel, M.D.

%

To the plaintiff Janet Nightengale

%

To third party

%

Total must equal

100%

Please answer Question No. 10.
Question No. 10: What is the total amount of economic damages, if any, sustained by
Janet Nightengale as a result of the negligence of the parties listed above in response to Question
No. 9'7
Answer to Question No. 10:

$_---

Question No. 11: What is the total amount of non-economic damages, if any, sustained
by Janet Nightengale as a result of the negligence of the parties listed above in response to
Question No.9?

000530
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Answer to Question No. 11:

$_---

IDJI2d 1.41.4.3
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INSTRUCTION NO. 38
I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you regarding
matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In a few minutes
counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you will retire to the jury room for
your deliberations.
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations.

Therefore, the

attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the outset of
deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of opinion on the
case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the beginning, one's sense
of pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to change that position, even if shown that it
is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for
me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth.
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the objective of
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of
you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and
consideration of the case with your fellow jurors.

IDJI2d 1.13
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INSTRUCTION NO. 39
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, who will preside
over your deliberations.
An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. Follow the
directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required of you by the instructions
on the verdict form.
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As soon as
nine or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in the verdict, you
should fill it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary that the same nine agree on
each question. If your verdict is unanimous, your foreman alone will sign it; but if nine or more,
but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict.
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdicts, you will notify the bailiff, who
will then return you into open court.

IDJI2d 1.15.2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

JANET BELL NIGHTENGALE,
Case No. CV OC 0722814
Plaintiff,

SPECIAL VERDICT FORM
vs.
JASON QUINN, M.D.; IDAHO
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, P.A.; AND
KEVIN MATTHEW TIMMEL, M.D.,
Defendants.

We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:

Question No.1:

Did defendant Jason Quinn, M.D., negligently fail to meet the

applicable standard of health care practice in his treatment and care of Mrs. Nightengale?

Answer to Question No.1:

YesLJ

No L J

If you answered "No" to Question No.1, then do not answer Question No.2 and proceed
directly to Question No.3.
If you answered "Yes" to Question No.1, then answer Question No.2.

Question No.2: Was Dr. Quinn's negligence a proximate cause of Mrs. Nightengale's
injuries?

Answer to Question No.2:

YesLJ

No

LJ

Please answer Question No.3.
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SPECIAL VERDICT FORM- 1

Question No.3:

Did defendant Kevin Timmel negligently fail to meet the applicable

standard of health care practice in his treatment and care of Mrs. Nightengale?
Answer to Question No.3:

YesL]

NoL]

If your answers to Questions No. 1 and 3 were "No" you are finished. Please sign the
verdict form and tell the bailiff that you are finished. If you answered "Yes" to Question No.3,
then answer Question No.4.
Question No.4: Was Dr. Timmel's negligence a proximate cause of Mrs. Nightengale's
injuries?
Answer to Question No.4:

YesL]

NoL]

If your answers to Questions No. 2 and 4 were "No" you are finished. Please sign the
verdict form and tell the bailiff that you are finished. Otherwise, please answer Question No.5.
Question No.5: Was Janet Nightengale negligent?
Answer to Question No.5:

YesL]

NoL]

If your answer to Question No.5 was "No" do not answer Question No.6 and move
directly to Question No.7. If your answer to Question No.5 was "Yes" please answer Question
No.6.
Question No. 6:Was Janet Nightengale's negligence a proximate cause of her injuries?
Answer to Question No.6:

YesL]

NoL]

Please answer Question No.7.
Question No.7: Was a third party negligent?
If your answer to Question No. 7 was "No" do not answer Question No. 8 and move
directly to Question No.9. If your answer to Question No.7 was "Yes" please answer Question
No.8.
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Question No.8:

Was the third party's negligence a proximate cause of Mrs.

Nightengale's injuries?
Instruction for Question No.9: You will reach this question if you have found that

either defendant Dr. Quinn or defendant Dr. Timmel was negligent, which negligence caused
injury to plaintiff. In this question, you are to apportion the fault between the negligent partiesI!in
~

terms of a percentage. As to each party or entity to which you answered "Yes" on Questions
Nos. 2, 4, 6, and 8 determine the percentage of fault for that party or entity, and enter the
percentage on the appropriate line. If you answered "No" to any of the above questions, insert a
"0" or "Zero" as to that party or entity. Your total percentages must equal 100%.
Question No.9:

What is the percentage of fault (if any) you assign to each of the

following:
Answer to Question No.9:

To the Defendant, Jason Quinn, M.D ..

%

To the Defendant, Kevin Timmel, M.D.

%

To the plaintiff Janet Nightengale

%

To third party

%

Total must equal

100%

Please answer Question No. 10.
Question No. 10: What is the total amount of economic damages, if any, sustained by

Janet Nightengale as a result of the negligence of the parties listed above in response to Question
No.9?
Answer to Question No. 10:

$_---
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Question No. 11: What is the total amount of non-economic damages, if any, sustained
by Janet Nightengale as a result of the negligence of the parties listed above in response to
Question No.9?
Answer to Question No. 11:

$_---

Please sign the verdict form and notify the bailiff that you have finished your deliberations.

Dated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,2009
Presiding Juror
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Steven K. Tolman (ISB #1769)
TOLMAN & BRIZEE, P.C.
132 3rd Avenue East
P.O. Box 1276
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1276
Telephone: (208) 733-5566

J.

Clerk:

PATRICIA A DWONCH
DEPUTY

Attorney for Defendant Kevin Timmel, MD

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

[JORIGINAl
JANET BELL NIGHTENGALE,
Plaintiff,

Case No.

ev oe 0722814

DEFENDANT KEVIN TIMMEL, MOtS
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS

vs.
JASON QUINN, M.D.; IDAHO
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, P.A.;
KEVIN MATTHEW TIMMEL, M.D.; AND
EMERGENCY MEDICINE OF IDAHO,
PA AND ITS AFFILIATES,
Defendants.

COMES NOW the Defendant Kevin Timmel, M.D., by and through his counsel of
record, Tolman & Brizee, p.e., and submits the following proposed jury instructions
numbered 1 through 38, inclusively, as well as the Special Verdict Form. These proposed
instructions include the standard Idaho Pattern Jury Instructions as well as Requested or
modified Jury Instructions.
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Defendant reserves the right to amend, supplement or withdraw any of these
instructions.

J,fr~
DATED this _<7\_ day of September, 2009.
TOLMAN & BRIZEE, P.C.
;7

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

" tt.-,

I hereby certify that on this~D (fay of September, 2009, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT KEVIN TIMMEL, MD'S PROPOSED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS to be forwarded with all required charges prepared, by the method(s)
indicated below, to the following:
Kevin E. Dinius
MORROW DINIUS
5680 E. Franklin Rd., Suite 130
Nampa, 10 83687-7901
Kevin J. Scanlan
HALL FARLEY OBERRECHT & BLANTON
702 W Idaho, Suite 700
P.O. Box 1271
Boise, 10 83701

E¥

o
o

First Class Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile
Overnight Mail

all First Class Mail
~

o

o

Hand Delivered
Facsimile
Overnight Mail
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DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO.

1

THE VOIR DIRE
You have been summoned as prospective jurors in the lawsuit now before us.
The first thing we do in a trial is to select 12 jurors, and, perhaps one or two alternate
jurors from among you ladies and gentlemen.
I am the judge in charge of the courtroom and this trial. The deputy clerk of court
marks the trial exhibits and administers oaths to you jurors and the witnesses.

The

bailiff will assist me in maintaining courtroom order and will arrange for your meals after
this case has been submitted to you for decision.

The court reporter will keep a

verbatim account of all matters of record during the trial.
To assist both you and the attorneys with this process of selection of a jury, I will
introduce you to the parties and attorneys and tell you in brief what this lawsuit is about.
The parties who bring a lawsuit are called the "plaintiffs." In this suit, the plaintiff
is Janet Bell Nightengale. The plaintiff is represented by lawyer Kevin Dinius.

The

parties against whom a lawsuit is brought are called the "defendants." The defendants
in this suit are Jason Quinn, M.D. and Kevin Timmel, M.D.
represented by Kevin J. Scanlan.

Jason Quinn, M.D. is

Kevin Timmel, M.D. is represented by Steven K.

Tolman. This is a civil case involving a claim for medical malpractice.
A trial starts with a selection of a fair, impartial jury. To that end, the court and
the lawyers will ask each of you questions to discover whether you have any information
concerning the case or any opinions or attitudes which any of the lawyers believe might
cause you to favor or disfavor some part of the evidence or one side or the other. The
questions may probe deeply into your attitudes, beliefs and experiences, but they are
not intended to embarrass you.
If you do not hear or understand a question, you should say so.

If you do

understand the question, you should answer it freely.
The clerk of the court will now swear you for the jury examination.

IDJI 1-1 (modified)

000540
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Given - - - - - - Refused - - - - - - Modified,_ _ _ _ _ __
Covered _ _ _ _ _ __
Other_ _ _ _ _ __

DATED This

day of September, 2009

District Judge

000541
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 2

DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. _2_

These instructions explain your duties as jurors and define the law that applies to
this case. It is your duty to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these
instructions to those facts, and in this way to decide the case. Your decision should be
based upon a rational and objective assessment of the evidence. It should not be based
on sympathy or prejudice.
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case,
and it is your duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions as
a whole, not picking out one and disregarding others. The order in which these
instructions are given or the manner in which they are numbered has no significance as
to the importance of any of them. If you do not understand an instruction, you may send
a note to me through the bailiff, and I will try to clarify or explain the point further.
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this
trial. This evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into
evidence, and any stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of the
attorneys may help you understand the evidence and apply the instructions, what they
say is not evidence. If an attorney's argument or remark has no basis in the evidence,
you should disregard it.
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times during
the trial, I sustained an objection to a question without permitting the witness to answer
it, or to an offered exhibit without receiving it into evidence. My rulings are legal matters,
and are solely my responsibility. You must not speculate as to the reason for any
objection, which was made, or my ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision you
may not consider such a question or exhibit or speculate as to what the answer or
exhibit would have shown. Remember, a question is not evidence and should be
considered only as it gives meaning to the answer.
There were occasions where an objection was made after an answer was given
or the remark was made, and in my ruling on the objection I instructed that the answer
or remark be stricken, or directed that you disregard the answer or remark and dismiss

000542
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 3

,
r

it from your minds. In your deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark,
but must treat it as though you had never heard it.
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course
of the trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you
believe and what weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this
courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives. There is no magical
formula for evaluating testimony. In your everyday affairs, you determine for yourselves
whom you believe, what you believe and how much weight you attach to what you are
told. The considerations you use in making the more important decisions in your
everyday dealings are the same considerations you should apply in your deliberations in
this case.

IDJI2d 1.00

Given --------------Refused - - - - - - - Modified________
Covered - - - - - - - - Other_________
DATED This
day of September, 2009

District Judge

000543
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DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. - 3
-During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions
concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into
evidence and any notes taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings.
If you take notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is not thereby
diverted from the witness or his testimony; and you must keep your notes to yourself
and not show them to other persons or jurors until the jury deliberations at the end of
the trial.

IDJI2d 1.01

Given - - - - - - - Refused - - - - - - Modified- - - - - - Covered - - - - - - Other- - - - - - - DATED This ___ day of September, 2009

District Judge

000544
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 5

,

,

DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO.

4

There are certain things you must not do during this trial:
1.

You must not associate in any way with the parties, any of the attorneys or

their employees, or any of the witnesses.
2.

You must not discuss the case with anyone, or permit anyone to discuss

the case with you. If anyone attempts to discuss the case with you, or to influence your
decision in the case, you must report it to me prompt/yo
3.

You must not discuss the case with other jurors until you retire to the jury

room to deliberate at the close of the entire case.
4.

You must not make up your mind until you have heard all of the testimony

and have received my instructions as to the law that applies to the case.
5.

You must not contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gain a greater

understanding of the case.
6.

You must not go to the place where any alleged event occurred.

IDJI2d 1.03

Given ------------Refused - - - - - - - - Modified- - - - - - Covered - - - - - - - Other- - - - - - - - - DATED This ____ day of September, 2009

District Judge

000545
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DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. _5_

Members of the jury, I remind you that you are not to discuss this case among
yourselves or with anyone else, nor to form any opinion as to the merits of the case,
until after I finally submit the case to you.

IDJI2d 1.03.1

Given - - - - - - - Refused - - - - - - Modified" - - - - - - Covered - - - - - - Other- - - - - - - DATED This ___ day of September, 2009

District Judge

000546
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DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. _6_

Whether a party has insurance is not relevant to any of the questions you are to
decide. You must avoid any inference, speculation or discussion about insurance.

IDJI2d 1.04

Given - - - - - - - Refused _ _ _ _ _ __
Modified- - - - - - Covered - - - - - - Other_ _ _ _ _ _ __
DATED This
day of September, 2009

District Judge

000547
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 8

DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO.

7

Any statement by me identifying a claim of a party is not evidence in this case. I
have advised you of the claims of the parties merely to acquaint you with the issues to
be decided.

IDJI2d 1.05

Given - - - - - - - Refused - - - - - - Modified- - - - - - Covered - - - - - - Other_ _ _ _ _ _ __
DATED This
day of September, 2009

District Judge

000548
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DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. _8_

The following facts are not in dispute:
1. Janet Bell Nightengale presented to the emergency room at St Luke's
Regional Medical Center on June 1,2007, where she was seen by
Stephanie Bodes, M.D.
2. Janet Bell Nightengale presented to the emergency department of S1. Luke's
Regional Medical Center, on June 18, 2007, where she was seen
by Marlin Jack Trainer, D.O.
3.

Janet Bell Nightengale presented to the emergency department of Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center on July 11,2007, and she was
seen by Jason Quinn, M.D.

4.

Janet Bell Nightengale presented to the emergency department of St.
Luke's Regional Medical Center, Ltd., on July 16, 2007, and she
was seen by Kevin Timmel, MD.

5. Janet Bell Nightengale presented to the Terry O'Reilly Clinic on July 20,
2007. Thereafter, and on that same day, plaintiff went to S1. Luke's
Regional Medical Center emergency department, where she was
seen by Rourke Yeakley, M.D.
6.

Janet Bell Nightengale was transferred to Saint Alphonsus Regional
Medical Center on July 20, 2007.

She was diagnosed with limb

ischemia, at which time she was determined to have an arterial
occlusion of the left arm which resulted in an above the elbow
amputation.

000549
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IDJI2d 1.07 (modified)

Given _ _ _ _ _ __
Refused _ _ _ _ _ __
Mod ifi ed _ _ _ _ _ __
Covered - - - - - - Other_ _ _ _ _--''--DATED This _ _ _ day of September, 2009

District Judge

000550
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 11

DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. _9_

Certain evidence is about to be presented to you by deposition. A deposition is
testimony taken under oath before the trial and preserved in writing. This evidence is
entitled to the same consideration you would give had the witness testified from the
witness stand.
You will only receive this testimony in open court. Although there is a record of
the testimony you are about to hear, this record will not be available to you during your
deliberations.

IDJI2d 1.22

Given - - - - - - - Refused - - - - - - Modified- - - - - - Covered - - - - - - Other_ _ _ _ _ _ __
DATED This ___ day of September, 2009

District Judge

000551
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 12

DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO.
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial.

-

10--

The law makes no distinction

between direct and circumstantial evidence. Each is accepted as a reasonable method of
proof and each is respected for such convincing force as it may carry.

IDJI2d 1.24.1

Given - - - - - - - Refused - - - - - - Modified- - - - - - Covered - - - - - - Other_ _ _ _ _ _ __
DATED This ___ day of September, 2009

District Judge

000552
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 13

DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO.

11

A witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter may give his opinion on
that matter. In determining the weight to be given such opinion, you should consider the
qualifications and credibility of the witness and the reasons given for his opinion. You are
not bound by such opinion. Give it the weight, if any, to which you deem it entitled.

IDJI 124

Given - - - - - - - Refused - - - - - - Modified- - - - - - Covered - - - - - - Other_ _ _ _ _ _ __
DATED This ___ day of September, 2009

District Judge

000553
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 14

DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. - 12- When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the
expression "if you find," or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded, that the
proposition is more probably true than not true.

IDJI2d 1.20.1

Given - - - - - - - Refused - - - - - - Mod ifi ed _ _ _ _ _ __
Covered - - - - - - Other_ _ _ _ _ _ __
DATED This ___ day of September, 2009

District Judge

000554
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 15

DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. _13_

On the claim of medical malpractice against Dr. Timmel for failure to meet the
applicable standard of health care practice, the plaintiff has the burden of proof on each
of the following propositions:
1.

That Dr. Timmel failed to meet the applicable standard of health care

practice as defined in these instructions;
2.

That the plaintiff was damaged;

3.

That the acts of Dr. Timmel which failed to meet the applicable standard of

health care practice were a proximate cause of the damages of the plaintiff; and
4.

The elements of damage and the amount thereof.

You will be asked the following questions on the jury verdict form:
Did defendant Kevin Timmel, M.D. breach the applicable standard of health care
practice in his care and treatment of Janet Bell Nightengale?
If so, did any breach of the standard of health care practice on the part of defendant
Kevin Timmel, M.D. proximately cause Janet Bell Nightengale's damages?
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the respective proposition
has been proved, you should answer the respective question or questions "Yes."
However, if you find that any of the propositions have not been proved, then the plaintiff
has not met the burden of proof required and you should answer the respective question
or questions "No."

IDJI2d 2.10.3 (modified); IDJI2d 1.41.1 (modified)
Given - - - - - - - Refused - - - - - - Modified_ _ _ _ _ __
Covered - - - - - - Other- - - - - - - DATED This ___ day of September, 2009

District Judge

000555
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 16

DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO.

14

The plaintiff in this medical malpractice case has the burden of affirmatively proving
by direct expert testimony, and by a preponderance of all competent evidence, that at the
time and place of the incident in question, Dr. Timmel negligently failed to meet the
applicable standard of health care practice of the community in which such care allegedly
was or should have been provided, as such standard then existed at the time and place of
the alleged negligence of defendant and as such standard then and there existed with
respect to the class of health care providers that Dr. Timmel then and there belonged to
and in which capacity he was functioning.
Dr. Timmel shall be judged in comparison with similarly trained and qualified
providers of the same class in the same community, taking into account training,
experience and fields of medical specialization.

Idaho Code § 6-1012

Given - - - - - - - Refused - - - - - - Modified- - - - - - Covered - - - - - - Other_ _ _ _ _ _ __
DATED This
day of September, 2009

District Judge

000556
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 17

DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. _15_

When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause which, in natural or
probable sequence, produced the injury, the loss or the damage complained of. It need
not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury,
loss or damage. It is not a proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have
occurred anyway.
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury.
Plaintiff must prove proximate cause by expert testimony, by a preponderance of
the evidence, and to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.

IDJI2d 2.30.2 (modified)
Swallow v. Emergency Medicine of Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589,67 P.3d 68 (2003)
Hilden v. Ball, 117 Idaho 314, 787 P.2d 1122 (1989)
Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210,796 P.2d 87 (1990)
Flowerdew v. Warner, 90 Idaho 164,409 P.2d 110 (1965)
Maxwell v. Women's Clinic, P.A., 102 Idaho 53,625 P.2d 407 (1981)
Hall v. Bacon, 93 Idaho 1,453 P.2d 816 (1969)
Schofield v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hospital, 90 Idaho 186,409 P.2d 107 (1965)

Given - - - - - - - Refused - - - - - - Modified- - - - - - Covered _ _ _ _ _ __
Other- - - - - - - DATED This ___ day of September, 2009

District Judge

000557
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 18

DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO.

16

When I use the word "negligence in these instructions, I mean the failure to use
ordinary care in the management of one's property or person. The words "ordinary
care" mean the care a reasonably careful person would use under circumstances
similar to those show by the evidence. Negligence may thus consist of the failure to do
something which a reasonably careful person would do, or the doing of something a
reasonably careful person would not do, under circumstances similar to those show by
the evidence. The law does not say how a reasonably careful person would act under
those circumstances. That is for you to decide.

IDJI 2.20 - Definition of negligence

Given ---------------Refused - - - - - - - Modified- - - - - - Covered - - - - - - - - Other_ _ _ _ _ _ __
DATED This
day of September, 2009

District Judge

000558
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DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. _17_

As used in these instructions, the term "community" refers to that geographical area
ordinarily served by the licensed general hospital at or nearest to which the care was or
allegedly should have been provided.

Idaho Code § 6-1012
Grimes v. Green, 113 Idaho 519,746 P.2d 978 (1987)
Dekker v. M.v.R.M.C., 115 Idaho 332,766 P.2d 1213 (1988)

Given - - - - - - - Refused _ _ _ _ _ __
Modified. _ - - - - - Covered - - - - - - Other- - - - - - - DATED This ___ day of September, 2009

District Judge

000559
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 20

DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. - 18-In determining whether Dr. Timmel's care of Janet Bell Nightengale satisfied or
breached the applicable standard of care of health care practice as it has been stated to
you, you are not permitted to arbitrarily set a standard of your own. The only way you may
properly learn the applicable standard of care is through evidence presented in this trial by
health care providers, including physicians, called as expert witnesses.

The expert

witness's testimony can only be considered by the jury if (a) the expert opinion is actually
held by the expert witness; (b) that the expert's opinion can be testified to with reasonable
medical certainty, and (c) that the expert witness possesses professional knowledge and
expertise coupled with actual knowledge of the applicable community standard to which
his or her expert opinion testimony is addressed.

Idaho Code § 6-1013
BAJI 214-B (modified)

Given - - - - - - - Refused - - - - - - Modified- - - - - - Covered - - - - - - Other=---:=-------DATED This ___ day of September, 2009

District Judge

000560
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 21

DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. _19_

If the plaintiff proves through expert testimony that Dr. Timmel breached the
applicable standard of health care practice, plaintiff has the additional burden of proving
through expert testimony Dr. Timmel's breach of the applicable standard of health care
practice was, with a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the proximate cause of Janet
Bell Nightengale damages.
If you find Dr. Timmel breached the applicable standard of health care practice, but
that this was not the proximate cause of Janet Bell Nightengale's damages, then your
verdict must be for Dr. Timmel.

Conrad v. St. Clair, 100 Idaho 401, 599 P.2d 292 (1979)
Swallow v. Emergency Medicine of Idaho. P.A., 138 Idaho 589,67 P.3d 68 (2003)
Sheridan v. St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, 135 Idaho 775,25 P.3d 88 (2001)
Doe v. Garcia, 126 Idaho 1036, 895 P.2d 1229 (Ct. App. 1995)

Given - - - - - - - Refused - - - - - - Modified. _ - - - - - Covered - - - - - - Other_ _ _ _ _ _ __
DATED This
day of September, 2009

District Judge

000561
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 22

DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. - 20-When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause which, in natural or
probable sequence, produced the complained injury, loss or damage, and but for that
cause the damage would not have occurred. It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient
if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a proximate
cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway.

IDJI 2.30.1 - Proximate cause "but for" test

Given - - - - - - - Refused _ _ _ _ _ __
Mod ifi ed _ _ _ _ _ __
Covered - - - - - - Other_-------DATED This
day of September, 2009

District Judge

000562
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 23

DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO.

21

further instruct you that medical practitioners, such as Dr. Timmel are not
insurers of the correctness of their treatment.

The mere fact that an undesirable or

unfortunate result occurred following medical care rendered by Dr. Timmel does not, of
itself, establish a breach of the applicable standard of health care practice on the part of
Dr. Timmel.

Willis v. Western Hospital Ass'n, 67 Idaho 435,182 P.2d 950 (1947)

Given - - - - - - - Refused _ _ _ _ _ __
Modified- - - - - - Covered - - - - - - Other- - - - - - - DATED This ___ day of September, 2009

District Judge

000563
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 24

DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO.

22

Dr. Timmel may not be held liable for the breach of the applicable standard of
health care practice, if any, by any other health care provider involved in the care of
Janet Bell Nightengale.

IDJI2d 2.40 (modified)

Given - - - - - - - Refused - - - - - - Modified- - - - - - Covered - - - - - - Other= - : - - - - - - - DATED This ___ day of September, 2009

District Judge

000564
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DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. _23_

In this case, the Defendant has alleged that Janet Bell Nightengale was negligent
in not following medical advice regarding her care and treatment. On this defense, the
Defendant has the burden of proof of each of the following propositions:
1. Janet Bell Nightengale was negligent, and
2. The negligence of Janet Bell Nightengale was a proximate cause of her own
injuries.

IDJI 1.41.4.2 - Companion instruction - defendant's burden (modified)

Given - - - - - - - Refused - - - - - - Modified- - - - - - Covered - - - - - - Other- - - - - - - DATED This ___ day of September, 2009

District Judge

000565
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 26

DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO.

24

By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion
as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages.

IDJI2d 9.00

Given - - - - - - - Refused _ _ _ _ _ __
Mod ifi ed _ _ _ _ _ __
Covered - - - - - - Other_ _ _ _ _ _ __
DATED This
day of September, 2009

District Judge

000566
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DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO.

25

If the jury decides the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant, the jury
must determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate the
plaintiff for any damages proved to be proximately caused by defendant's negligence.
The elements of damage the jury may consider are:
A. Non-economic damages

1.

The nature of the injuries;

2.

The physical and mental pain and suffering, past and future;

3.

The impairment of abilities to perform usual activities;

4.

The disfigurement caused by the injuries;

B. Economic damages
1.

The reasonable value of necessary medical care received and expenses

incurred as a result of the injury and the present cash value of medical care and expenses
reasonably certain and necessary to be required in the future;
2.

The reasonable value of necessary services provided by another in doing

things for the plaintiff, which, except for the injury, the plaintiff would ordinarily have
performed and the present cash value of such services reasonably certain to be required
in the future.
Whether the plaintiff has proved any of these elements is for the jury to decide.

IDJI 9.01 - Damage instruction for injuries to plaintiff - general case (modified)
Given _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Refused - - - - - - Modified- - - - - - Covered - - - - - - Other_ _ _ _ _ _ __
DATED This
day of September, 2009

District Judge

000567
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DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. _26_
You are instructed that if you find the plaintiff is entitled to damages that you may
award only such damages as have been proved by plaintiff with reasonable certainty.

Mclean v. City of Spirit lake, 91 Idaho 779, 430 P.2d 670 (1967)
Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 95 Idaho 752, 519 P.2d 421 (1974)
Hake v. Delane, 117 Idaho 1058, 793 P.2d 1230 (1990)

Given - - - - - - Refused _ _ _ _ _ __
Modified- - - - - - Covered - - - - - - Other_ _ _ _ _ __
DATED This
day of September, 2009

District Judge

000568
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 29

DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. _27_

A person asserting a claim of damages has the burden of proving not only a right to
damages, but also the amount of damages.

Idaho law does not permit arriving at an

alleged amount of damages by guessing or conjecture.

Beare v. Stowes' Builders Supply, 104 Idaho 317,658 P.2d 988 (Ct. App. 1983)

Given - - - - - - - Refused - - - - - - Modified _ _ _ _ _ __
Covered - - - - - - Other_ _ _ _ _ _ __
DATED This
day of September, 2009

District Judge

000569
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 30

DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. - 28- The amount of damages claimed either by the written pleadings or in the argument
of counsel must not be considered by you as evidence of reasonable compensation.

Idaho Code § 10-111

Given
-------Refused - - - - - - Modified- - - - - - Covered _ _ _ _ _ __
Other
DATED This ___ day of September, 2009
~=--------

District Judge

000570
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 31

DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO.

29

A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the
damage and prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to exercise
such care cannot be recovered.

IDJI2d 9.14

Given - - - - - - - Refused - - - - - - Modified- - - - - - Covered - - - - - - Other_ _ _ _ _ _ __
DATED This
day of September, 2009

District Judge

000571
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 32

DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. _30_
In fixing the amount of money which will reasonably and fairly compensate the
plaintiff, you are to consider that a person who is injured must exercise ordinary care to
minimize the damage and to prevent further damage. Any loss which results from a
failure of the plaintiff Janet Bell Nightengale to exercise such ordinary care cannot be
recovered by plaintiff.

IDJI2d 9.14 (modified)
Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 247,985 P.2d 669, 671 (1999)

Given - - - - - - - Refused - - - - - - Modified- - - - - - Covered - - - - - - Other_ _ _ _ _ _ __
DATED This
day of September, 2009

District Judge

000572
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 33

DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. - 31 -When I use the phrase "present cash value" as to any damage that may accrue in
the future, I mean that sum of money determined and paid now which, when invested at a
reasonable rate of interest, would be sufficient to pay the future damages at the time and
in the amount the future damages will be incurred.

IDJI2d 9.13

Given
-------Refused
------Modified- - - - - - Covered
------Other_ _ _ _ _ _ __
DATED This
day of September, 2009

District Judge

000573
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 34

DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO.

32

In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or
decide any question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If
money damages are to be awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may
not agree in advance to average the sum of each individual juror's estimate as the
method of determining the amount of the damage award or percentage of negligence.

IDJI2d 1.09

Given - - - - - - - Refused - - - - - - Modified _ _ _ _ _ __
Covered - - - - - - Other- - - - - - - DATED This ___ day of September, 2009

District Judge

JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 35
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DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO.

-

33- -

If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you
may send a note signed by one or more of you to the bailiff.

You should not try to

communicate with me by any other means than such a note.
During your deliberation, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on
any of the questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so by
me.

IDJI2d 1.11

Given - - - - - - - Refused - - - - - - Modified_ _ _ _ _ __
Covered - - - - - - Other- - - - - - - DATED This ___ day of September, 2009

District Judge
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DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. _34_
I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you
regarding matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the
facts. In a few minutes counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you
will retire to the jury room for your deliberations.
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore,
the attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At
the outset of deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic
expression of opinion on the case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one
does that at the beginning, one's sense of pride may be aroused and there may be
reluctance to change that position, even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you
are not partisans or advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no
triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth.
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the
objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual
judgment. Each of you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only
after a discussion and consideration of the case with your fellow jurors.

IDJI2d 1.13

Given ---------------Refused - - - - - - Modified- - - - - - - Covered - - - - - - Other---------------DATED This ___ day of September, 2009

District Judge
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DEFENDANTS INSTRUCTION NO.

35

Members of the Jury: In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that at least threefourths of the jury agree. Your verdict must represent the considered judgment of each
juror agreeing to it.
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual judgment. Each of
you must decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an impartial consideration of the
evidence with your fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to
reexamine your own views and change your opinion if convinced it is erroneous. But do
not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because
of the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
You are not partisans. You are judges--judges of the facts. Your sole interest is to
ascertain the truth from the evidence in the case.

IDJI2d 1.13.1

Given -------------Refused - - - - - - - - Modified - - - - - - - - - Covered ---------Other--------------DATED This ___ day of September, 2009

District Judge
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DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO.

-

36- -

On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, who will
preside over your deliberations.
An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions.
Follow the directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required of you
by the instructions on the verdict form.
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As
soon as nine or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in
the verdict, you should fill it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary that
the same nine agree on each question. If your verdict is unanimous, your foreman alone
will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so
agreeing will sign the verdict.
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdicts, you will notify the bailiff,
who will then return you into open court.

IDJI2d 1.15.2

Given -----------Refused - - - - - - - Modified- - - - - - - Covered - - - - - - Other_ _ _ _ _ _ __
DATED This
day of September, 2009

District Judge
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DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. _37_
You have now completed your duties as jurors in this case and are discharged
with the sincere thanks of this Court. You may now discuss this case with the attorneys
or with anyone else.

For your guidance, I instruct you that whether you talk to the

attorneys, or to anyone else, is entirely your own decision.

It is proper for you to

discuss this case, if you want to, but you are not required to do so, and you may choose
not to discuss the case with anyone at all. If you choose to talk to someone about this
case, you may tell them as much or as little as you like about your deliberations or the
facts that influenced your decisions.

If anyone persists in discussing the case over

your objection, or becomes critical of your service, either before or after any discussion
has begun, you may report it to me.

IDJI2d 1.17

Given --------------Refused ---------Modified- - - - - - - - Covered - - - - - - Other_ _ _ _ _ _ __
DATED This
day of September, 2009

District Judge
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DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. _38_
In this case, you will be given a special verdict form to use in returning your verdict.
This form consists of a series of questions that you are to answer. I will read the verdict
form to you now.

We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:

Question No.1: Was the plaintiff, Janet Bell Nightengale, negligent in her participation
and follow through in her own health care?
Answer to Question NO.1: Yes

L-.-1 No L-.-1

If the answer to Question No.1 is Yes, go to Question No.2. If the answer to Question
No.1 is No, skip Question No.2 and go to Question No.3.
Question No.2: Was plaintiff, Janet Bell Nightengale's, negligence a proximate cause of
her damages?
Answer to Question No.2: Yes

L-.-1 No L-.-1

If the answer to Question No.2 is Yes, go to Question No.3. If the answer to Question
No.2 is No, go to Question NO.3.

Question No.3: Did Defendant Jason Quinn, M.D., breach the standard of care in his
treatment of the plaintiff, Janet Bell Nightengale?
Answer to Question NO.3: Yes

L-.-1 No L-.-1

If the answer to Question NO.3 is Yes, go to Question NO.4. If the answer to Question
No.3 is No, skip Question No.4 and go to Question No.5.

Question No.4: Was Defendant Jason Quinn, M.D.'s, breach of the standard of care in
his treatment of the plaintiff, Janet Bell Nightengale, a proximate cause of plaintiffs
damages?
Answer to Question NO.4: Yes

L-.-1 No L-.-1

If the answer to Question NO.4 is Yes, go to Question No.5. If the answer to Question
No.4 is No, go to Question No.5.
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Question No.5: Did Defendant Kevin Timmel, M.D., breach the standard of care in his
treatment of the plaintiff, Janet Bell Nightengale?
Answer to Question No.5: Yes

l-.J No l-.J

If the answer to Question No.5 is Yes, go to Question No.6. If the answer to Question
No.5 is No, skip Question No.6 and go to the Instruction for Question No.7.

Question No.6: Was Defendant Kevin Timmel, M.D.'s, breach of the standard of care
in his treatment of the plaintiff, Janet Bell Nightengale, a proximate cause of plaintiffs
damages?
Answer to Question No.6: Yes

l-.J No l-.J

If the answer to Question No.6 is Yes, go to the Instruction for Question No.7. If the
answer to Question No.6 is No, go to the Instruction for Question No.7.
Instruction for Question No.7: You will answer this question only if you have found that
the actions of one or both of the Defendants (Jason Quinn, M.D., and/or Kevin Timmel,
M.D.), were the proximate cause of any damages to the Plaintiff. In this question, you
are to apportion the fault between any parties for whom you found proximate cause. As
to each party or entity to which you answered "Yes" to the proximate cause questions
(Question Nos. 2, 4, and 6), you must determine the percentage of fault for that party or
entity, and enter the percentage on the appropriate line. If you answered "No" to the
proximate cause question for a party, insert a "0" or "Zero" as to that party or entity.

Question No.7: What is the percentage of fault (if any) you assign to each of the
following:
To the Plaintiff, Janet Bell Nightengale

- -%

To the Defendant, Jason Quinn, M.D.

- -%
- -%

To the Defendant, Kevin Timmel, M.D.
Total must equal 100%

If the percentage of fault you assigned to the Plaintiff, Janet Bell Nightengale, is equal to
or greater than the percentage of fault you assigned to one or both of the Defendants
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(Jason Quinn, M.D., and/or Kevin Timmel, MD.), you are done. Sign the verdict and
advise the Bailiff.

If the percentage of fault assigned to the Plaintiff is less than the

percentage of fault you assigned to the Defendants, answer Question NO.8.
Answer to Question No.8: We assess Plaintiffs damages as follows:
1. Economic damages, as defined in the Instructions:

$-----------------------------2. Non-economic damages, as defined in the Instructions:

$------------------------------------Sign the verdict and advise the Bailiff.

There will be a place to insert the date and a signature line for the jury foreperson and
each member of the jury who joins in the verdict to sign.

IDJI 1.43.1 - Example verdict on special interrogatories
IDJI 1.43.1 - Instruction on special verdict form

Given -----------Refused -----------Mod ifi ed,_________
Covered - - - - - - - Other-------------DATED This ___ day of September, 2009

District Judge
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Steven K. Tolman (ISB #1769)
Nicole L. Cannon (ISB #5502)
TOLMAN & BRIZEE, P.C.
132 3rd Avenue East
P.O. Box 1276
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1276
Telephone: (208) 733-5566
Attorney for Defendant Kevin Timmel, MD

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

JANET BELL NIGHTENGALE,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV OC 0722814
DEFENDANT KEVIN TIMMEL, M.D. 'S
PROPOSED SPECIAL VERDICT FORM

vs.
JASON QUINN, M.D.; IDAHO
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, P.A.;
KEVIN MATTHEW TIMMEL, M.D.; AND
EMERGENCY MEDICINE OF IDAHO,
PA AND ITS AFFILIATES,
Defendants.

We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:

Question NO.1: Was the plaintiff, Janet Bell Nightengale, negligent in her participation
and follow through in her own health care?
Answer to Question No.1: Yes ~ No ~
If the answer to Question No.1 is Yes, go to Question No.2. If the answer to Question
No.1 is No, skip Question No.2 and go to Question NO.3.
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Question NO.2: Was plaintiff, Janet Bell Nightengale's, negligence a proximate cause of
her damages?
Answer to Question No.2: Yes

L.-J No L.-J

If the answer to Question No.2 is Yes, go to Question No.3. If the answer to Question
No.2 is No, go to Question No.3.

Question NO.3: Did Defendant Jason Quinn, M.D., breach the standard of care in his
treatment of the plaintiff, Janet Bell Nightengale?
Answer to Question No.3: Yes

L.-J No L.-J

If the answer to Question No.3 is Yes, go to Question No.4. If the answer to Question
NO.3 is No, skip Question NO.4 and go to Question NO.5.

Question NO.4: Was Defendant Jason Quinn, M.D.'s, breach of the standard of care in
his treatment of the plaintiff, Janet Bell Nightengale, a proximate cause of plaintiff's
damages?
Answer to Question No.4: Yes

L.-J No L.-J

If the answer to Question No.4 is Yes, go to Question No.5. If the answer to Question
NO.4 is No, go to Question No.5.

Question NO.5: Did Defendant Kevin Timmel, M.D., breach the standard of care in his
treatment of the plaintiff, Janet Bell Nightengale?
Answer to Question No.5: Yes

L.-J No L.-J

If the answer to Question No.5 is Yes, go to Question No.6. If the answer to Question
NO.5 is No, skip Question No.6 and go to the Instruction for Question No.7.

Question NO.6: Was Defendant Kevin Timmel, M.D.'s, breach of the standard of care
in his treatment of the plaintiff, Janet Bell Nightengale, a proximate cause of plaintiff's
damages?
Answer to Question No.6: Yes

L.-J No L.-J

If the answer to Question No.6 is Yes, go to the Instruction for Question NO.7. If the
answer to Question No.6 is No, go to the Instruction for Question No.7.
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Instruction for Question No.7: You will answer this question only if you have found that
the actions of one or both of the Defendants (Jason Quinn, M.D., and/or Kevin Timmel,
M.D.), were the proximate cause of any damages to the Plaintiff. In this question, you
are to apportion the fault between any parties for whom you found proximate cause. As
to each party or entity to which you answered "Yes" to the proximate cause questions
(Question Nos. 2, 4, and 6), you must determine the percentage of fault for that party or
entity, and enter the percentage on the appropriate line. If you answered "No" to the
proximate cause question for a party, insert a "0" or "Zero" as to that party or entity.

Question No.7: What is the percentage of fault (if any) you assign to each of the
following:
To the Plaintiff, Janet Bell Nightengale
To the Defendant, Jason Quinn, M.D.
To the Defendant, Kevin Timmel, MD.

- -%
- -%

- -%

Total must equal 100%

If the percentage of fault you assigned to the Plaintiff, Janet Bell Nightengale, is equal to
or greater than the percentage of fault you assigned to one or both of the Defendants
(Jason Quinn, M.D., and/or Kevin Timmel, MD.), you are done. Sign the verdict and
advise the Bailiff. If the percentage of fault assigned to the Plaintiff is less than the
percentage of fault you assigned to the Defendants, answer Question NO.8.

Answer to Question No.8: We assess Plaintiff's damages as follows:
1. Economic damages, as defined in the Instructions:

$----------------------------------2. Non-economic damages, as defined in the Instructions:

$----------------------------------Sign the verdict and advise the Bailiff.
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DATED This _ _ _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , 2009.

Foreperson

Juror

Juror

Juror

Juror

Juror

Juror

Juror

Juror

Juror

Juror

Juror

000586
DEFENDANT KEVIN TIMMEL, M.D.'S PROPOSED SPECIAL VERDICT FORM, PAGE 4

INSTRUCTION NO. _ _
THE VOIR DIRE
You have been summoned as prospective jurors in the lawsuit now before us.
The first thing we do in a trial is to select 12 jurors, and, perhaps one or two alternate
jurors from among you ladies and gentlemen.
I am the judge in charge of the courtroom and this trial. The deputy clerk of court
marks the trial exhibits and administers oaths to you jurors and the witnesses.

The

bailiff will assist me in maintaining courtroom order and will arrange for your meals after
this case has been submitted to you for decision.

The court reporter will keep a

verbatim account of all matters of record during the trial.
To assist both you and the attorneys with this process of selection of a jury, I will
introduce you to the parties and attorneys and tell you in brief what this lawsuit is about.
The parties who bring a lawsuit are called the "plaintiffs." In this suit, the plaintiff
is Janet Bell Nightengale.

The plaintiff is represented by lawyer Kevin Dinius.

The

parties against whom a lawsuit is brought are called the "defendants." The defendants
in this suit are Jason Quinn, M.D. and Kevin Timmel, M.D.
represented by Kevin J. Scanlan.

Jason Quinn, M.D. is

Kevin Timmel, M.D. is represented by Steven K.

Tolman. This is a civil case involving a claim for medical malpractice.
A trial starts with a selection of a fair, impartial jury. To that end, the court and
the lawyers will ask each of you questions to discover whether you have any information
concerning the case or any opinions or attitudes which any of the lawyers believe might
cause you to favor or disfavor some part of the evidence or one side or the other. The
questions may probe deeply into your attitudes, beliefs and experiences, but they are
not intended to embarrass you.
If you do not hear or understand a question, you should say so.

If you do

understand the question, you should answer it freely.
The clerk of the court will now swear you for the jury examination.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

These instructions explain your duties as jurors and define the law that applies to
this case. It is your duty to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these
instructions to those facts, and in this way to decide the case. Your decision should be
based upon a rational and objective assessment of the evidence. It should not be based
on sympathy or prejudice.
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case,
and it is your duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions as
a whole, not picking out one and disregarding others. The order in which these
instructions are given or the manner in which they are numbered has no significance as
to the importance of any of them. If you do not understand an instruction, you may send
a note to me through the bailiff, and I will try to clarify or explain the pOint further.
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this
trial. This evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into
evidence, and any stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of the
attorneys may help you understand the evidence and apply the instructions, what they
say is not evidence. If an attorney's argument or remark has no basis in the evidence,
you should disregard it.
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times during
the trial, I sustained an objection to a question without permitting the witness to answer
it, or to an offered exhibit without receiving it into evidence. My rulings are legal matters,
and are solely my responsibility. You must not speculate as to the reason for any
objection, which was made, or my ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision you
may not consider such a question or exhibit or speculate as to what the answer or
exhibit would have shown. Remember, a question is not evidence and should be
considered only as it gives meaning to the answer.
There were occasions where an objection was made after an answer was given
or the remark was made, and in my ruling on the objection I instructed that the answer
or remark be stricken, or directed that you disregard the answer or remark and dismiss
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it from your minds. In your deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark,
but must treat it as though you had never heard it.
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course
of the trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you
believe and what weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this
courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives. There is no magical
formula for evaluating testimony. In your everyday affairs, you determine for yourselves
whom you believe, what you believe and how much weight you attach to what you are
told. The considerations you use in making the more important decisions in your
everyday dealings are the same considerations you should apply in your deliberations in
this case.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions
concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into
evidence and any notes taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings.
If you take notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is not thereby
diverted from the witness or his testimony; and you must keep your notes to yourself
and not show them to other persons or jurors until the jury deliberations at the end of
the trial.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

There are certain things you must not do during this trial:
1.

You must not associate in any way with the parties, any of the attorneys or

their employees, or any of the witnesses.
2.

You must not discuss the case with anyone, or permit anyone to discuss

the case with you. If anyone attempts to discuss the case with you, or to influence your
decision in the case, you must report it to me promptly.
3.

You must not discuss the case with other jurors until you retire to the jury

room to deliberate at the close of the entire case.
4.

You must not make up your mind until you have heard all of the testimony

and have received my instructions as to the law that applies to the case.
5.

You must not contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gain a greater

understanding of the case.
6.

You must not go to the place where any alleged event occurred.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

Members of the jury, I remind you that you are not to discuss this case among
yourselves or with anyone else, nor to form any opinion as to the merits of the case,
until after I finally submit the case to you.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

Whether a party has insurance is not relevant to any of the questions you are to
decide. You must avoid any inference, speculation or discussion about insurance.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

Any statement by me identifying a claim of a party is not evidence in this case.

J

have advised you of the claims of the parties merely to acquaint you with the issues to
be decided.

000594

INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

The following facts are not in dispute:
1. Janet Bell Nightengale presented to the emergency room at St Luke's
Regional Medical Center on June 1, 2007, where she was seen by
Stephanie Bodes, M.D.
2. Janet Ben Nightengale presented to the emergency department of St. Luke's
Regional Medical Center, on June 18,2007, where she was seen
by Marlin Jack Trainer, D.O.
3.

Janet Bell Nightengale presented to the emergency department of Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center on July 11, 2007, and she was
seen by Jason Quinn, M.D.

4.

Janet Bell Nightengale presented to the emergency department of St.
Luke's Regional Medical Center, Ltd., on July 16, 2007, and she
was seen by Kevin Timmel, M.D.

5. Janet Bell Nightengale presented to the Terry O'Reilly Clinic on July 20,
2007. Thereafter, and on that same day, plaintiff went to St. Luke's
Regional Medical Center emergency department, where she was
seen by Rourke Yeakley, M.D.
6.

Janet Bell Nightengale was transferred to Saint Alphonsus Regional
Medical Center on July 20, 2007.

She was diagnosed with limb

ischemia, at which time she was determined to have an arterial
occlusion of the left arm which resulted in an above the elbow
amputation.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

Certain evidence is about to be presented to you by deposition. A deposition is
testimony taken under oath before the trial and preserved in writing. This evidence is
entitled to the same consideration you would give had the witness testified from the
witness stand.
You will only receive this testimony in open court. Although there is a record of
the testimony you are about to hear, this record will not be available to you during your
deliberations.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial.

The law makes no distinction

between direct and circumstantial evidence. Each is accepted as a reasonable method of
proof and each is respected for such convincing force as it may carry.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

A witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter may give his opinion on
that matter. In determining the weight to be given such opinion, you should consider the
qualifications and credibility of the witness and the reasons given for his opinion. You are
not bound by such opinion. Give it the weight, if any, to which you deem it entitled.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the
expression "if you find," or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded, that the
proposition is more probably true than not true.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

On the claim of medical malpractice against Dr. Timmel for failure to meet the
applicable standard of health care practice, the plaintiff has the burden of proof on each
of the following propositions:
1.

That Dr. Timmel failed to meet the applicable standard of health care

practice as defined in these instructions;
2.

That the plaintiff was damaged;

3.

That the acts of Dr. Timmel which failed to meet the applicable standard of

health care practice were a proximate cause of the damages of the plaintiff; and
4.

The elements of damage and the amount thereof.

You will be asked the following questions on the jury verdict form:
Did defendant Kevin Timmel, M.D. breach the applicable standard of health care
practice in his care and treatment of Janet Bell Nightengale?
If so, did any breach of the standard of health care practice on the part of defendant
Kevin Timmel, M.D. proximately cause Janet Bell Nightengale's damages?
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the respective proposition
has been proved, you should answer the respective question or questions "Yes."
However, if you find that any of the propositions have not been proved, then the plaintiff
has not met the burden of proof required and you should answer the respective question
or questions "No."
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